Regrettably, the list in question offers limited operational value, as it omits the so-called «exit» CIDR's utilised by major cloud service providers – a glaring omission that renders the dataset largely superficial.
Let's, for analytical clarity, set aside the UK and examine Germany as an isolated datapoint.
AWS, for instance, possesses and operates the entirety of the 3.0.0.0/9 address space – a range distributed across numerous jurisdictions and continents. Notably, significant CIDR allocations from 3.0.0.0/9 reside within German territory, yet remain absent from the RIPE registry. Such inadvertent obfuscation undermines efforts at precise geolocation.
One may, through inference and correlation – specifically via https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json – arrive at a reasonably accurate estimation of the German CIDR's by aggregating address ranges tied to a designate AWS region they are associated with. Such inference is only feasible due to the vendor’s decision to publish such data. I would reasonably conjecture that other cloud providers engage in a comparable practice.
Thus, whilst it is not altogether impossible to ascertain the geolocation of a given IP address, the exercise remains contingent upon the discretionary transparency of global infrastructure operators and multiple indirect information sources – a rather fragile foundation upon which to build certainty.