I understand they gotta make a buck, but I find it interesting this is the first real negative to running a unique email address per company/site I work with.
I understand they gotta make a buck, but I find it interesting this is the first real negative to running a unique email address per company/site I work with.
Edit: When I try to do a domain search I get told:
> Domain search restricted: You don't have an active subscription so you're limited to searching domains with up to 10 breached addresses (excluding addresses in spam lists).
My domain has 11 breached addresses.
But I think you are right, because I only have 3 breached addresses under my domain (I do see the 10 addresses wording under subscriptions)
I understand, but it's frustrating.
Log into dashboard, under business there is a domains tab. Enter your domain there and verify ownership. Didn’t ask for payment.
For ID fraud, more than an email address has to be leaked.
I might not get an email if someone gets that account info.
In practice, anything that high-profile will be plastered all over every tech news site, twitter, reddit, probably even the news. It would be difficult for MasterCard/Visa to have dataleaks, even just email/pass, fly under the radar (I imagine...)
Oracle tried to cover up a data leak, and it didn't go great. Oracle touches nowhere near as many every-day people as MasterCard does
[1]: https://www.troyhunt.com/welcome-to-the-new-have-i-been-pwne...
Email addresses are not secrets under any stretch of the meaning of that word.
Harvesting potential targets is one part of it i.e. establishing someone was using an email address is the entry point. There's a lot of emails, so associating them to any particular website is right near the start. Establishing that they're active increases their value further.
The people responding to Troy here for example are technically doing that: they clearly monitor the email or still use it, so addresses which respond to up in value.
So cost was always part of this strategy
I meant that you are already paying for those, so being charged by providers to support our hacky email addresses is not a novelty introduced by Troy's service
In a way if I reply, the other party gets upgraded to one of my 5 addresses, so if they send an email to ContosoCoffeeShop@myname.com I might reply from whatever flavour I'm using nowadays or is more appropriate like hello@myname.com
It's like a 3 layer security system, the least privileged get access to one very specific address, if they send me an email which makes sense and I reply, they get upgraded to a bucket. I might sign up directly with a bucket email and skip the most paranoid layer, that's fine.
In general I try to take more care of the newest alias and become more liberal with my older more ruined addresses, alias1@ has like 8 years of signups, while alias5@ has just 1 if any. And I'm sure the list will grow.
Downside is that if there's a leak it's harder to attribute exactly, but at least I can check the recipient to get some kind of hint.
It's more like art than it is a water-tight security protocol. You paint the world with your wacky addresses and occasionally surprise the observant employee with the inverted expectations (usually the name comes before the at)
Thank you for coming to my ted talk.
If I ever have to give a generated address out to an actual person, then I'll let them know replies will come from a different address. So far I'd guess 99.999% of the emails I received are transactional emails and/or sent from noreply@...
Far more annoying are a few websites I use that only support magic links for login--my password manager doesn't auto fill them, and some of them I now have a number of accounts at due to inconsistent spelling/formatting.
The parent can log in because they have a map of site<->password. But without either the site or the password, the notification that an email address is compromised is useless.