As I understand, the purpose of "secure enclaves" is to enforce DRM, copyright protection, anti-debugging measures, so breaking them is a good thing.
With that said, I'd rather see it broken than not, considering it's mostly used for negative stuff, and it isn't open enough to evaluate if it actually is secure enough.
In general, non-Android non-ChromeOS Linux is not good at this sort of thing: half a dozen sandboxing frameworks exist, but none of them are particularly secure.
Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module?
There are no frameworks that use secure enclave for this purpose either. It's purpose is copyright protection and preventing user from removing features like advertisement and telemetry, not making your system safer.
> Also, suppose you want to load an obscure kernel module that reads an obscure filesystem format. How do you sandbox the module?
You should use microkernels.
Of course the obvious solution is don't run malware. Android's need for security partly comes from the fact that the primary repository/store distributes tons of dubious code that it grants network access and keeps up to date. If you stick to e.g. F-droid and turn off automatic updates, you don't find yourself in this adversarial position.
Like I said, the Android team does not think so. Nor does the ChromeOS team, which uses selinux to sandbox the browser, something no other non-Android Linux distro does (except possibly secureblue, which sadly almost no one uses).
Not only, it has many purposes. I'm also the administrator of my computer, and some things I want to be unchangable by software, unless I myself unlock it, like I don't want anyone to be able to boot or install other OSes than the ones I've installed myself. The secure enclave and secure boot is perfect for this, even if my computer gets malware they won't be able to access it, and even if someone gets physical access to my computer, they won't be able to boot their OS from a USB.
But also: TPMs could be used to prevent evil maid attacks and to make it uneconomical for thieves who stole your device to also steal your data. It makes it possible for devices to remotely attest to their owners that the OS has not been compromised, which is relevant to enterprise IT environments. There are a lot of good uses for this technology, we just need to solve the political problems of aggressive copyright, TIVOization, etc.
Any feature controlled by the owner of the computer is good; features controlled by anyone else like the manufacturer can be bad. And note that in this viewpoint, leasing makes you temporary owner.
No need for the keys or decryption to touch easily intercepted and rowhammered RAM.