Your emotions are surely caused by the chemical soup, but chemical soup need not be the only way to arrive at emotions. It is possible for different mechanisms to achieve same outcomes.
Let me pose back to you a related question as my answer: How do you know that I feel emotions rather than merely emulating emotional behavior?
This gets into the philosophy of knowing anything at all. Descartes would say that you can't. So we acknowledge the limitation and do our best to build functional models that help us do things other than wallow in existential loneliness.
But you can propose explanations and try to falsify them. I haven’t thought about it but maybe there is a way to construct an experiment to falsify the claim that you don’t feel emotions.
Preface:
The problem of the relation between our bodies and our minds, and especially of the link between brain structures and processes on the one hand and mental dispositions and events on the other is an exceedingly difficult one. Without pretending to be able to foresee future developments, both authors of this book think it improbable that the problem will ever be solved, in the sense that we shall really understand this relation. We think that no more can be expected than to make a little progress here or there.
... well. Thanks a bunch, Karl.
Also, you don't know what species I am. Maybe I'm a dog. :-)
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_...)
Also assuming psychopaths don‘t experience emotions is going going with a very fringe theory of psychology. Very likely psycopaths experience emotions, they are maybe just very different emotions from the ones you and I experience. I think a better example would be a comatose person.
That said I think talking about machine emotions is useless. I see emotions as a specific behavior state (that is you will behave in a more specific manner) given a specific pattern of stimuli. We can code our computers to do exactly that, but I think calling it emotions would just be confusing. Much rather I would simply call it a specific kind of state.
1) I know that I have emotions because I experience them.
2) I know that you and I are very similar because we are both human.
3) I know that we can observe changes in the brain as a result of our changing emotions and that changes to our brains can affect our emotions.
I thus have good reason to believe that since I experience emotions and that we are both human, you experience emotions too.
The alternative explanation, that you are otherwise human and display all the hallmarks of having emotions but do not in fact experience anything (the P-zombie hypothesis), is an extraordinary claim that has no evidence to support it and not even a plausible, hypothetical mechanism of action.
With an emotional machine I see no immediately obvious even hypothetical evidence to lend support to its veracity. In light of all this, it seems extraordinary to claim that non-biological means achieving real emotions (not emulated emotions) are possible.
After all, emulated emotions have already been demonstrated in video games. To call those sufficient would be setting an extremely low bar.