There is no reason to believe that consciousness, sentience, or emotions require a biological base.
Even if a machine really is conscious, we don't have enough information to ever really know if it is.
My emotions are definitely a function of the chemical soup my brain is sitting in (or the opposite).
Let me pose back to you a related question as my answer: How do you know that I feel emotions rather than merely emulating emotional behavior?
This gets into the philosophy of knowing anything at all. Descartes would say that you can't. So we acknowledge the limitation and do our best to build functional models that help us do things other than wallow in existential loneliness.
But you can propose explanations and try to falsify them. I haven’t thought about it but maybe there is a way to construct an experiment to falsify the claim that you don’t feel emotions.
Preface:
The problem of the relation between our bodies and our minds, and especially of the link between brain structures and processes on the one hand and mental dispositions and events on the other is an exceedingly difficult one. Without pretending to be able to foresee future developments, both authors of this book think it improbable that the problem will ever be solved, in the sense that we shall really understand this relation. We think that no more can be expected than to make a little progress here or there.
... well. Thanks a bunch, Karl.
Also, you don't know what species I am. Maybe I'm a dog. :-)
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Internet,_nobody_knows_...)
Also assuming psychopaths don‘t experience emotions is going going with a very fringe theory of psychology. Very likely psycopaths experience emotions, they are maybe just very different emotions from the ones you and I experience. I think a better example would be a comatose person.
That said I think talking about machine emotions is useless. I see emotions as a specific behavior state (that is you will behave in a more specific manner) given a specific pattern of stimuli. We can code our computers to do exactly that, but I think calling it emotions would just be confusing. Much rather I would simply call it a specific kind of state.
1) I know that I have emotions because I experience them.
2) I know that you and I are very similar because we are both human.
3) I know that we can observe changes in the brain as a result of our changing emotions and that changes to our brains can affect our emotions.
I thus have good reason to believe that since I experience emotions and that we are both human, you experience emotions too.
The alternative explanation, that you are otherwise human and display all the hallmarks of having emotions but do not in fact experience anything (the P-zombie hypothesis), is an extraordinary claim that has no evidence to support it and not even a plausible, hypothetical mechanism of action.
With an emotional machine I see no immediately obvious even hypothetical evidence to lend support to its veracity. In light of all this, it seems extraordinary to claim that non-biological means achieving real emotions (not emulated emotions) are possible.
After all, emulated emotions have already been demonstrated in video games. To call those sufficient would be setting an extremely low bar.
We only have one good example of consciousness and sentience, and that is our own. We have good reason to suspect other entities (particularly other human individuals, but also other animals) have that as well, but we cannot access it, and not even confirm its existence. As a result using these terms of non-human beings becomes confusing at best, but it will never be actually helpful.
Emotions are another thing, we can define that outside of our experience, using behavior states and its connection with patterns of stimuli. For that we can certainly observe and describe behavior of a non biological entity as emotional. But given that emotion is something which regulates behavior which has evolved over millions of years, whether such a description would be useful is a whole another matter. I would be inclined to use a more general description of behavior patterns which includes emotion but also other means of behavior regulators.
there are many parts of human cognition, phycology etc. especially related to consciousness that are known unknowns and/or completely unknown.
a mitigation for this isaue would be to call it generally applicable intelligence or something, rather than human like intelligence. implying ita not specialized AI but also not human like. (i dont see why it would need to be human like, because even with all the right logic and intelligence a human can still do something counter to all of that. humans do this everyday. intuitive action, or irrational action etc.
what we want is generally applicable intelligence, not human like intelligence.
How does a computer with full AGI experience the feeling of butterflies in your stomach when your first love is required?
How does a computer experience the tightening of your chest when you have a panic attack?
How does a computer experience the effects of chemicals like adrenaline or dopamine?
The A in AGI stands for “artificial” for good reason, IMO. A computer system can understand these concepts by description or recognize some of them them by computer vision, audio, or other sensors, but it seems as though it will always lack sufficient biological context to experience true consciousness.
Perhaps humans are just biological computers, but the “biological” part could be the most important part of that equation.
Interestingly the people doing the actual envelope pushing in this domain, such as Ilya Sutskever, think that there it’s a scaling problem, and neural nets do result in AGIs eventually, but I haven’t heard them substantiate it.
(I'm asking because of your statement, "Don’t fool yourself into believing artificial intelligence is not one breakthrough away", which I'm not sure I understand, but if I am parsing it correctly, I question your basis for saying it.)
“one breakthrough away” as in some breakthrough away
This is not much different than saying that it’s possible to fly a spacecraft to another galaxy because spacecrafts exist and other galaxies exist.
Possible and practically attainable are two far different things.
It is very different. We have never seen a spacecraft reach another galaxy so we don't know it is possible.
We have an example of what we call intelligence arising in matter. We don't know what hurdles there are between current AI and an AGI, but we know that AGI is possible.
Let me know when I’ll be able to buy my $30,000 car with level 5 self driving.
I find anyone with confident answers to questions like these immediately suspect.
There is reason to believe that consciousness, sentience, or emotions require a biological base.
Or
There is no reason to believe that consciousness, sentience, or emotions do not require a biological base.
The first is simple, if there is a reason you can ask for it and evaluate it's merits. Quantum stuff is often pointed to here, but the reasoning is unconvincing.
The second form There is no reason to believe P does not require Q.
There are no proven reasons but there are suspected reasons. For instance if the operation that nerons perform is what makes consciousness work, and that operation can be reproduced non-biologicLly it would follow that non biological consciousness would be possible.
For any observable phenomenon in the brain the same thing can be asked. So far it seems reasonable to expect most of the observable processes could be replicated.
None of it acts as proof, but they probably rise to the bar of reasons.