SIM card is a good example. Technically, that's trivially solvable with a PKI infrastructure (a malicious user can't trivially and successfully misrepresent as google.com): operator runs their CA, and by signing your certificate, they attest that you are the owner of a particular phone number. No malicious user can mess with that (other than attacking the CA).
What they can do is attack end-user devices through different cheaper means (social engineering, malicious apps, exploits...), and extract individuals' private keys, thus allowing them to misrepresent as that individual. A SIM card protects against this by not making private key accessible in the first place.
This is exactly what locked devices do: they protect customers from not knowing how to properly (including securely) use their devices.
This is what we need to focus on as technologists: if we know how to securely use our devices, how do we opt out of others "protecting" us, and take full responsibility and liability for security lapses?