I'd argue that, by definition, mathemtatics is not, and cannot be, a science. Mathematics deals with provable truths, science cannot prove truth and must deal falsifiability instead.
In the end arguing about whether mathematics is a science or not makes no more sense than bickering about tomates being fruit; can be answered both yes and no using reasonable definitions.
Mathematicians actually do the same thing as scientists: hypothesis building by extensive investigation of examples. Looking for examples which catch the boundary of established knowledge and try to break existing assumptions, etc. The difference comes after that in the nature of the concluding argument. A scientist performs experiments to validate or refute the hypothesis, establishing scientific proof (a kind of conditional or statistical truth required only to hold up to certain conditions, those upon which the claim was tested). A mathematician finds and writes a proof or creates a counter example.
The failure of logical positivism and the rise of Popperian philosophy is obviously correct that we can't approach that end process in the natural sciences the way we do for maths, but the practical distinction between the subjects is not so clear.
This is all without mention the much tighter coupling between the two modes of investigation at the boundary between maths and science in subjects like theoretical physics. There the line blurs almost completely and a major tool used by genuine physicists is literally purusiing mathematical consistency in their theories. This has been used to tremendous success (GR, Yang-Mills, the weak force) and with some difficulties (string theory).
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Einstein understood all this:
> If, then, it is true that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, can we ever hope to find the right way? Nay, more, has this right way any existence outside our illusions? Can we hope to be guided safely by experience at all when there exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without getting to the root of the matter? I answer without hesitation that there is, in my opinion, a right way, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realisation of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed. - Albert Einstein
That's the thing, though — It does make sense, and it's an important distinction. There is a reason why "mathematical certainty" is an idiom — we collectively understand that maths is in the business of irrefutable truths. I find that a large part of science skepticism comes from the fundamental misunderstanding that science is, like maths, in the business of irrefutable truths, when it is actually in the business of temporarily holding things as true until they're proven false. Because of this misunderstanding, skeptics assume that science being proven wrong is a deathblow to science itself instead of being an integral part of the process.
[1] And even this has limits: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel%27s_incompleteness_theor...
Solipsists would like to have a word with you...
When we try to model something probabilistically, it is usually not a great idea to model the probability that we made an error in our probability calculations as part of our calculations of the probability.
Ultimately, we must act. It does no good to suppose that “perhaps all of our beliefs are incoherent and we are utterly incapable of reason”.
But we can be more sure of the deductive validity of a proof than we can be of any of the claims you make in these sentences, so I don't think they can serve to establish any doubt. If we're wrong about deductive logic, then we can only be more wrong about any empirical claims, which rely on deductive logic plus empirical observations
In practice when proofs of research mathematics are checked, they go out to like 4 grad students. This isn't a very glamorous job for those grad students. If they agree then it's considered correct...
But note this is just the bleeding edge stuff. The basic stuff is checked and reproven by every math undergrad that learns math. Literally millions of people have checked all the proofs. As long as something is taught in university somewhere, all the people who are learning it (well, all the ones who do it well) are proving / checking the theory.
Anyway, when the scientific community accepts a bad proof what effectively happens is that we've just added an extra axiom.
Like when you deliberately add new axioms, there are 3 cases
- Axiom is redundant: it can be proven from the other axioms. (this is ... relatively fine? we tricked ourselves into believing something that is true is true, the reason is just bad.)
This can get discovered when people try to adapt the bad proof to prove other things and fail.
Also people find and publish and "more interesting", "different" proofs for old theorems all the time. Now you have redundancy.
- Axiom contradicts other axioms: We can now prove p and not p.
I wonder if this has ever happened? I.e. people proving contradictions, leading them to discover that a generally accepted theorem's proof is incorrect. It must have happened a few times in history, no?
o/c maybe the reason this hasn't happened is that the whole logical foundation of mathematics is new, dating back to the hilbert program (1920s).
There are well known instances of "proofs" being overturned before that, but they're not strictly logically proofs in the hilbert-program sense, just arguments. (Of course they contain most of the work and ideas that would go into a correct proof, and if you understand them you can do a modern proof)
e.g. https://mathoverflow.net/a/35558
Cauchys proof that, if a sequence of continuous functions converges [pointwise] to a function, the limit function is also continuous (cauchys proof only holds for uniform convergence, not pointwise convergence - but people didnt really know the difference at the time)
- Axiom is independent of other axioms: You can't prove or disprove the theorem.
English doesn't have a "I'm just hypothesizing all of this" voice, if it did exist this post should be in it. I didn't do enough research to answer your question. Some of the above may be wrong, e.g. the part about the 4 grad students. One should probably look for historical examples.
Math is scientific in the sense that you've proposed a hypothesis, and others can test it.
Also the empirical part means natural phenomena needs to be involved. Math can be purely abstract.
If you want to escape human fallibility, I'm afraid you're going to need divine intervention. Works checked as carefully as possible still seem to frequently feature corrections.
That isn't true, you just test new axioms but most stuff we do in empirical sciences don't require new axioms.
The only difference between material sciences and math is that in math you don't test axioms while in empirical sciences you do.
And a lot of what goes on in foundations of mathematics could be described as "testing the axioms", i.e. identifying which theorems require which axioms, what are the consequences of removing, adding, or modifying axioms, etc.
The incompleteness theorem doesn't say that there are statements which are unprovable in any absolute sense. What it says is that given a formal system, there will always be statements which that particular formal system can't prove. But in fact as part of the proof, Godel proves this statement, just not by deriving it in the formal system in question (obviously, since that's what he's proving is impossible).
The way this is done is by using a "metalanguage" to talk about the formal theory in question. In this case it's a kind of ambient set theory. Of course, the proof also implies that if this ambient metalanguage is formalized then there will be sentences which it can't prove either, but these in general will be different sentences for each formalized theory.
The "symbol pushing" is a methodological tool, and a very useful one that opened up the possibility of new expansive fields of mathematics.
(Of course, it is important to always distinguish between properties of the abstraction or the tool from the object of study.)