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Comment by bnl_umass | Hacker News Reader

The math and the code is all there. I’d love to have a discussion about what the real value is. Further, why hasn’t the Tor Project provided this calculation? Why hasn’t anyone? I think it’s necessary.

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The assumption is the adversary controls x of N nodes. When x=N the probability of discovering the onion service IP is 1. But the adversary can not achieve this situation as he only controls the additional nodes. The existing nodes still stay in the network, they do not disappear. The ratio is not x/N but x/(x+N).

The formula is wrong and it all falls apart.

You can adjust the code on the page easily (it’s open source javascript) to determine the question you are after, which is a valid one: if an adversary starts today and adds x nodes to the existing network, what is their success rate?

BUT the author asked a different (but valid) question: assuming the adversary controls x out of N existing nodes, what is the success rate? I am unclear: is the assertion that everyone’s relay is honest today? From a privacy standpoint, that’s not a great assumption.

No, the author is presenting an idea that $25 a month can buy you a node. That fits adding a new node to the network, not taking over an existing node.

I am the author. I am telling you are wrong about that.

We are all, in unison, saying you -the author- is the one who is wrong.

Posting some words on a URL does not make them factually accurate.

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