https://scipython.com/blog/uranium-enrichment-and-the-separa...
How would this help? Nuclear power plant and enrichment facility are separate entities.
https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destr...
The critical mass required for a weapon shrinks as enrichment increases; implosion designs would require an infinite mass at or below 5.4% enrichment (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium).
Weapons-grade uranium is more like 85%+ U-235. Enrichment above around 20% is what really raises red flags.
Which, as I understand it, is because at 20% enrichment you've already done about 70% of the work needed to get to 85%.
All it takes is the enrichment to produce the fissile material for a weapon.
As far as I know countries have agreed to not build weapons, with the exception of those that already have them, there is an international body that monitors enrichment sites, but checks are voluntary a country can choose to not accept inspections and/or build additional secret enrichment sites.
The fissile material is not sufficient for a weapon though, as I understand there is quite a bit of science that goes into making a bomb.
Additionally, first generation weapons are large and unwieldy, i.e it takes a bomber to deploy a single weapon with a very small yield.
Miniaturization, building a weapon small and light enough to put on a missile is a significant problem that took the current powers years to get over.
But that's about it, if you can figure out how to make a small bomb of variable yield, you can make bombs small enough to fit a large backpack, and thermonuclear weapons that fit in a ballistic missile as well.
Thermonuclear bombs use uranium in the tamper of the secondary. Some use enriched uranium there.
The solution to these issues is just to manage the enrichment supply chain. If a country wants nuclear power but can't be trusted, supply then with at cost uranium.