An attacker’s blunder gave us a look into their operations | Hacker News Reader

An attacker’s blunder gave us a look into their operations

huntress.com

183 pointsmellosouls107 comments

I don't work in cybersecurity and, after looking at the site's homepage, couldn't exactly figure out from all the buzzwords what exactly is this product. The most concerning takeaway from this article for me is that the maintainers of Huntress (whatever it is) can keep a log of, as well as personally access, the users' browser history, history of launched executables, device's hostname, and presumably a lot of other information. How is this product not a total security nightmare?

It's definitely not a product for an individual user. Controls like this are useful in certain arenas where you need total visibility of corporate devices. As with any highly privileged tool or service, compromise of it can be a big problem. That said, the goal with tools like this is to usually lock down and keep a close eye on company issued laptops and the like so you know when one gets stolen, hit by some malware, or somebody does things with it they aren't allowed to be doing (e.g. exfiltrating corp data, watching porn at work, running unauthorized executable, connecting to problematic networks, etc.).

As an example, if you're at a FedRAMP High certified service provider, the DoD wants to know that the devices your engineers are using to maintain the service they pay for aren't running a rootkit and that you can prove that said employee using that device isn't mishandling sensitive information.

This makes sense, but in this case, isn't the company behind Huntress having direct access to this data still a problem? For example, if the government purchased Outlook licenses, I'd assume DoD can read clerks' emails, but Microsoft employees can't. I imagine worst case compromising a lot of Huntress' users is just a question of compromising of its developers, like one of the people in the authors section of this article.

Many businesses outsource their SOC to third parties like Huntress, Carbon Black, SentinelOne, all of whom offer very fancy Endpoint Detection and Respone (EDR) tools. Just about every EDR solution is a Cloud/SaaS offering provided either directly or indirectly through a third party Managed Service Provider (MSP). We call this Managed Detection and Respone (MDR). From technical and privacy standpoints, it probably sounds like a huge risk, but it's also worth acknowledging that EDR companies operate immense threat intelligence platforms through real-time monitoring of customers. From a C-suite perspective, it makes a lot of sense to offload the specializations of real-time protection and malware analysis to EDR solutions. There are risk managers who have quantified the risk tolerance for these types of products/arrangements. The company legal department, the CFO, and the board of directors are all satisfied with the EDR solutions placement on the Gartner quadrant and SOC Type 3 report saying the EDR provider follows best practices. Sometimes it's even a requirement for "cyber insurance" which a business may need depending on the industry. For better or for worse, EDR is how most institutions secure their IT infrastructure today.

For worse, I would say. This kind of thing is about accountability shuffling and not at all about improving security.

I'm concerned that you're not familiar with EDR and organizations who flat out can't build a full 24/7 SOC. Which is the vast majority of businesses.

EDR is a rootkit based on the idea that malware hashes are useless, and security needs to get complete insight into systems after a compromise. You can't root out an attacker with persistence without software that's as invasive as the malware can get.

And a managed SOC is shifting accountability to an extent because they are often _far_ cheaper than the staff it takes to have a 24/7 SOC. That's assuming you have the talent to build a SOC instead of paying for a failed SOC build. Also, don't forget that you need backup staff for sick leave and vacation. And you'll have to be constantly hiring due to SOC burnout.

If all of this sounds like expensive band-aids instead of dealing with the underlying infection, it is. It's complex solutions to deal with complex attackers going after incredibly complex systems. But I haven't really heard of security solutions that reduce complexity and solve the deep underlying problems.

Not even theoretical solutions.

Other than "unplug it all".

> This kind of thing is about *accountability shuffling* and not at all about improving security.

You nailed it. Can't really blame CISOs for pursuing this model though.

It would be a shame if justice ever found itself obstructed by "accountability shuffling".

Huh? Small and medium sized businesses have how much to spend on security? Let alone IT?

> For example, if the government purchased Outlook licenses, I'd assume DoD can read clerks' emails, but Microsoft employees can't.

Funny, my automatic assumption when using any US based service or US provided software is that at a minimum the NSA is reading over my shoulder, and that I have no idea who else is able to do that, but that number is likely > 0. If there is anything that I took away from the Snowden releases then it was that even the most paranoid of us weren't nearly paranoid enough.

Oh, absolutely. There are some ways to avoid this--customer managed encyrption keys, for example--but there will always be some kind of trade-off. The less an EDR (endpoint detection & response) tool can see, the less useful it is. Going with a customer managed encryption approach means the customer is then on the hook for watching and alerting on suspicious activity. Some orgs have the capacity and expertise to do this. Many do not. It often comes down to deciding if you have a budget to do this yourself to a level you and an auditor/customer is comfortable with (and proving it) or outsourcing to a known and trusted expert.

EDIT: For additional context, I'd add that security/risk tradeoffs happen all the time. In practice trusting Huntress isn't too different than trusting NPM with an engineer that has root access to their machine or any kind of centralized IT provisioning/patching setup.

You would think so, but in general the kind of attitude to security that results in these kinds of products actively encourages increasing the number of entities that have very highly privileged access to your system. 'Supply chain attacks' and 'attack surface' don't really register in this area, but 'buy this and you will be more secure' sales pitches very much do, especially with a dose of FOMO from 'industry standard' rhetoric.

It looks like Huntress is a "install this on your computer and we'll watch over your systems and keep you safe, for sure."

I also find it kind of funny that the "blunder" mentioned in the title, according to the article is ... installing Huntress's agent. Do they look at every customer's google searches to see if they're suspicious too?

It's stated in the article: "The standout red flag was that the unique machine name used by the individual was the same as one that we had tracked in several incidents prior to them installing the agent."

However, it's obvious that protection-ware like this is essentially spyware with alerts. My company uses a similar service, and it includes a remote desktop tool, which I immediately blocked from auto-startup. But the whatever scanner sends things to some central service. All in the name of security.

Directly impinging the enterprise-approved security tooling is really not a good idea, no matter your own personal opinions on their functionality.

Unless maybe you just want to develop a more personal relationship with your internal cybersecurity team, who knows.

Or with the HR team and the corporate security guys assisting your departure from the building holding a small cardboard box.

Things are not so rigid here. Idk how you could work in the environment you and the parent comment describe.

I'm not. But I know plenty of people who do.

I would assume any machine not owned by me is fully compromised and there is no recovery possible. And treat it accordingly, such as using it just for the purpose the owner of the machine dictates assuming I value that relationship.

The startup script you blocked could have just been a decoy. And set off a red flag.

A lot of these EDR's operate in kernel space.

I found that creepy too. Apparently `blunder == installing their software`

A threat actor installing software specifically designed to log and monitor attacks from threat actors would be considered a blunder, no?

Well they aren't wrong. Crowdstrike showed how much of a blunder it can become.

It´s also a lot of assumptions. This probably is an attacker - or wannabe at least. But you could be a student or researcher working on a cyber security course looking and for some projects your search flow would look a lot like this.

They mention in the write up that they correlated certain indicators with what they had seen in other attacks to be reasonably sure they knew this was an active attacker.

The problem to me is that this is the kind of thing you'd expect to see being done by a state intelligence organization with explicitly defined authorities to carry out surveillance of foreign attackers codified in law somewhere. For a private company to carry out a massive surveillance campaign against a target based on their own determination of the target's identity and to then publish all of that is much more legally questionable to me. It's already often ethically and legally murky enough when the state does it; for a private company to do it seems like they're operating well beyond their legal authority. I'd imagine (or hope I guess) that they have a lawyer who they consulted before this campaign as well as before this publication.

Either way, not a great advertisement for your EDR service to show everyone that you're shoulder surfing your customers' employees and potentially posting all that to the internet if you decide they're doing something wrong.

> The standout red flag was that the unique machine name used by the individual was the same as one that we had tracked in several incidents prior to them installing the agent.

The machine was already known to the company as belonging to a threat actor from previous activity

Yes, but only according to the company's own logs, which were not externally validated. To rephrase, the company thinks this was an active attacker based on logs its own tool generates. It does not discount the possibility that the tool generated erroneous logs or identified the wrong machine(s).

That's not very convincing. They still abused trust placed in them - by an active attacker, granted, but still... This seems like a legally risky move and it doesn't inspire trust in Huntress.

Who's trust? Their job is to hunt down and research threat actors. The information gained from this is used to better protect their enterprise customers.

This gains more trust with their customers and breaking trust with ... threat actors?

>Who's trust? Their job is to hunt down and research threat actors

No, their job is to provide EDR protection for their customers.

Threat intelligence is a thing.in fact there’s entire companies that sell just that. In fact, there’s entire government organizations that do just that.

Sure but that's not what their customer was engaging with them to do. It's not ethical to sell "EDR" services and then use that access to spy on your customers for intelligence purposes.

That is what I said, yes.

Well lets be real, you dont decide one day "today is the day we read one users entire history" and BLAMMO its a hacker! Lets keep reading!

Indeed, this article makes them look bad. Seems completely tone deaf to release this as a puff piece about the product.

Actually we just thought it was interesting that an attacker installed our EDR agent on the machine they use to attack their victims. That’s really bad operational security and we were able to learn a lot from that access.

What is weird to me is that you have access to this information at all? It would make sense for the people who use your software ... the IT departments or whatever to have access but why on earth do your engineers need access? What gates access to your customers' machines? What triggers a write-up like this? Hostnames, "machine names" are ... not unique by nature.

Huntress is a cybersecurity company. They’re specifically hired for this purpose, to protect the company and its assets.

As far as unique identifiers go, advertisers use a unique fingerprint of your browser to target you individually. Cookies, JavaScript, screen size, etc, are all used.

The article states that the "attacker" downloaded the software via a Google ad, not deployed by their corporate IT.

I'm also slightly curious as to if you might be associated with an EDR vendor? I notice that you only have three comments ever, and they all seem to be defending how EDR software and Huntress works without engaging with this specific instance.

Again, threat actors are well aware of what they’re downloading. FWIW I’m an offsec specialist. I spend a lot of time bypassing EDR. Im just shocked at how little this crowd is aware of OpSec and threat intel. I’ll crawl back into my Reddit hole

I'm so sorry you're getting this kind of response. Your input is valuable and I'm learning a lot.

If you just want a different source, I can vouch for what cybergreg is saying.

Cybersecurity companies aren't passive data collectors like, say, Dropbox. They actively hunt for attacks in the data. To be clear, this goes way beyond MDR or EDR. The email security companies are hunting in your email, the network security companies are hunting in your network logs, so on. When they find things, they pick up the phone, and sometimes save you from wiring a million dollars to a bad guy or whatever.

The customer likes this very much, even if individual employees don't.

Yeah they're in full damage control after realizing how out of touch they are when not talking to corporate suits for once.

I was also frustrated by this. I got about 25% of the way in and was annoyed that they still did such a poor job of communicating what their product is. An advertorial like this can often save the "And that's why Our Product is so great, it can protect you from attacks like these!" for the end, but here, where the article is about how merely installing their product gives Huntress the company full access to everything you do, it leaves me with more questions than answers.

As a corporate IT tool, I can see how Huntress ought to allow my IT department or my manager or my corporate counsel access to my browser history and everything I do, but I'm even still foggy on why Huntress grants themselves that level of access automatically.

Sure, a peek into what the bad guys do is neat, and the actual person here doesn't deserve privacy for his crimes, but I'd love a much clearer explanation of why they were able to do this to him and how if I were an IT manager choosing to deploy this software, someone who works at Huntress wouldn't be able to just pull up one of my employee's browser history or do any other investigating of their computers.

Their product is advertised as "Managed EDR". That usually means they employ a SOC that will review alerts and then triage and orchestrate responses accordingly. The use case here is when your IT manage chooses to deploy this and give them full visibility into your assets because your company wants to effectively outsource security response.

It's a relatively common model, with MDR and MSSP providers doing similar things. I don't see it as much with EDR providers though.

It pains me how this comment illustrates how ignorant most folks are of the consequences of installing software off the internet is (even technically inclined folks that hang out on HN). How many of us have non-security software installed on our computers today that do exactly these things... but sell the information? Definitely a non-zero number!

If folks understood this better, there would be less reason for software like Huntress' EDR to exist.

I don't think anyone is unfamiliar with the consequences of installing potential malware. I think people are surprised that a seemingly? legit company is going off and having a little pokeabout on arbitrary computers based on nothing more than a hostname match. Then sharing screenshots on HN. I guess they're Canadian but wow does this seem to have CFAA written all over it?

Where can I find that Potential Malware Inside™ sticker that warns everyone else who is familiar with the consequences? Asking for a friend!

https://www.etsy.com/market/malware_stickers or https://www.zazzle.com/alert_malware_detected_avoid_clicking...

Probably the huntress user agreed to hundreds of conditions when he clicked “I agree to the terms of service.”

Thanks for the feedback on not understanding what we sell from the homepage. We sell an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) product that we manage with our 24/7 SOC. To perform the investigations on potentially malicious activity, we can fetch files from the endpoint and review them. We log all of this activity and make it available to our customers. We are an extension of their security team, which means they trust us with this access. We’ve been doing this for more than 10 years and have built up a pretty good reputation, but I can see how that would freak some folks out. We also sell to businesses, so this is something that would be installed on a work computer.

>We are an extension of their security team, which means they trust us with this access

So if <bad actor> in this writeup read your pitch and decided to install your agent to secure their attack machine, it sounds like they "trusted you with this access". You used that access to surveil them, decide that you didn't approve of their illegal activity, and publish it to the internet.

Why should any company "trust you with this access"? If one of your customers is doing what looks to one of your analysts to be cooking their books, do you surveil all of that activity and then make a blog post about them? "Hey everyone here, it's Huntress showing how <company> made the blunder of giving us access to their systems, so we did a little surprise finance audit of them!"

Is it clear to users that their system is monitored and that they have consented to screengrabbing? Unless those screenshots were merely simulated from the Chrome history.

This would generally be covered in your corporate acceptable use policy or employee handbook, where ever your employer describes what is allowable on corporate devices and what is monitored when you use them. Some companies also display a notification when you log in along the lines of "This is an XYZ Corp system, all activity is logged and monitored for malicious behavior"

in general, if you're using a company owned device (the target for this product and many others like it) you should always assume everything is logged

In the US, on a corporate owned device there is no expectation of privacy.

Is this true outside the USA?

In the EU, employees have an expectation of privacy even on their corporate laptop. It is common for e.g. union workers to use corporate email to communicate, and the employer is not allowed to breach privacy here. Even chatter between worker is reasonably private by default.

I suspect, if the attacker is inside the EU, this article is technically a blatant breach of the GDPR. Not that the attacker will sue you for it, but customers might find this discomforting.

I can't imagine pen testers would be able to work in the EU without being able to access individual workstations without the users' knowledge.

The key difference here is that pen testing, as well as IT testing, is very explicitly scoped out in a legal contract, and part of that is that users have to told to consent to monitoring for relevant business purposes.

What happened in this blogpost is still outside of that scope, obviously. I doubt that Huntress could make the claim that their customer here was clearly told that they would be possibly monitoring their activity in the same way that a "Content to Monitoring" popup for every login on corporate machines does it.

It's an interesting question. Services like Huntress (there are many similar) only work by looking at what is happening on the computer. To some degree they are automated but there is a human review element to all of them where ultimately some person A will be looking at what some other person B did on the system. Not publishing it in a blog like this, but definitely violating the privacy of the valid user and/or a bad guy to some degree

How was an individual user (in this article's case, a phishing sites developer) able to install your software and seemingly not notice the level of access they gave you to their computer?

Windows doesn’t have application permissions like Mac, iOS, and Android. An app doesn’t specify what it need to be able to do, it inherits the permissions of the user that launched it. Not a great permissions model, but it’s legacy all the way back to the earliest versions of Windows.

This is a surprising response - I was expecting something like "they clicked past an alert notifying that they were giving us this level of access". Just because Windows only has a generic password prompt whenever an app wants to do something dangerous, doesn't mean you can't inform the user via your app's own UI. Others like AnyDesk do exactly that.

this product is typically silently mass deployed to all systems within an organization, completely unknown to the individual users. afaik there is no user interface or way to interact with the software from the computer, its all managed in a central web console

You’re really missing the point here. Huntress is an MDR, a cybersecurity company. They protect the endpoint by monitoring it for malicious activity and responding in kind. It’s what they do, not unlike Crowdstrike, Microsoft, etc. Generally a threat actor will install a security agent like this to find a bypass in order to attack more victims. They know exactly what they’re doing.

>They know exactly what they’re doing.

Strongly disagree. If they installed this to do some analysis they would have done that in a VM if they “knew exactly what they were doing”.

Either you snared a script kiddy, or your software download and install process that followed that google ads click was highly questionable.

I think it´s obvious from the browser history in the blog posting that script kiddy is for sure

Poor english skills if I had to guess; the article mentions they had to translate things, and they didn't read the ToS.

If you work in any mid to large enterprise, there is a tool like this installed on your laptop.

It was put there by your security team.

Those things are what MTR/MDR solutions do. They track where you go and what processes are running and spawn other processes, etc. it allows tenants to see how an exploit progresses or stops, etc. these systems can also do web filtering for the tenant as well as keep logs as to what sessions get established and so on. That’s how these products work.

If you work for a company that's bigger than a mom and pop, chances are very good that your IT department has this same level of access to any computer used in the organization. Huntress is basically an outsourced portion of the IT department for smaller companies that don't have their own 24/7 security team. It's a pretty common thing, with many vendors offering this type of service. Your work computer may have a similar product/service installed

This makes total sense.. Except who is the SMB in this case? It sounds like the person just downloaded this off the Internet, it wasn't pre-installed by IT. So it sounds like Huntress has full and complete access to whoever downloads their software to try it out/demo it... and aren't afraid to use this access for their own purposes/just do a bit of poking around because why not? When a hostname matches?

Reminds me of when a Hostgator employee told me on reddit that he liked digging through peoples' websites and chatted with me about the stuff I had hosted on my website.

That's potentially different, to be fair. Websites are generally made with the intention of making them public, and unless you're digging through stuff that hasn't been made public, there's nothing wrong with browsing your customers' websites and talking about it. (Of course, maybe that's what the Hostgator employee was doing - in which case, shame on them.)

On the other hand, I'm pretty sure that the person who installed Huntress did not intend to upload any info at all, let alone to have that information made public.

No he was digging through my FTP contents that weren't publicly viewable.

yeah i don't know about the legality or morality of what huntress did here. i just know these types of products/this level of access are very common

Their customers are companies. Almost every company, of at least a certain size, has one or more security tools installed on every host in the organization; there are called Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) tools. Some marquee products are SentinelOne and CrowdStrike Falcon, but there are dozens. Huntress makes their own security tool but operates it for their customers as a service, which is called Managed Detection & Response (MDR). Everything on this page is legit.

Huntress is a security company.

One of the tools they make is a Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) product.

The kind of thing that goes on every laptop, server, and workstation in certain controlled environments (banks, government, etc.).

> couldn't exactly figure out from all the buzzwords what exactly is this product

I suspect this is deliberate.

Disturbing that they would be proud enough of spying on their users to post this. Threat intelligence is nearly as bad as the threats themselves. From crowdstrike destroying computer systems to this type of spying on their own users, who wants to trust these people? What happened to holding microsoft accountable for the security of their products?

So many of the comments here seem to be completely unaware of what an EDR does. Do none of you all work for companies with managed devices? There isn't anything abnormal here...

I work on a REM team in a SOC for a big finance company all you US people know. An employee can't hardly fart in front of their corporate machine without us knowing about it. How do you all think managed cyber security works?

The point you seem to be (intentionally?) missing is that this wasn't installed by the IT staff in an org to an employee's computer, an user downloaded their software to trial it an they just happened to take a peek on all of his activity based on tenuous evidence at best.

They might be under the impression that all this activity is looked at by someone for curiosity’s sake -snooping. It isn’t. People only look and discover if there is reason (a critical alert or some legal action). No one goes snooping to see what sites Joe visited this morning for no reason at all.

> No one goes snooping to see what sites Joe visited this morning for no reason at all.

In fact, I have worked at several organizations in which this type of activity would be a terminable offense.

For some value of 'spying', I guess. This is a product, as noted above, that say, a corporate IT dept. is installing in your company-issued laptop. Which means the customer, that is, not you, is okay with this behavior; it is what they are paying for.

It’s not that we’re spying on users for fun. We’re analyzing the browser history so determine if the history contains any sites that are associated with malicious activity. We definitely don’t care about your pr0n

Jesus.

I can rob people one at a time or I can go rob the bank. I can break into your clients one at a time or I can break into your "security" company.

Where is the product that keeps that data, your infrastructure safe? Why arent you selling that. Oh wait there is no such thing as it does not exist.

You are a compromise by a state level actor waiting to happen. In fact if you were compromised by a state level actor it is in your companies best interest to cover it up rather than disclose it (as that would be the end of your organization).

It's the fox guarding the hen house.

At some point were going to find out that a government, China, Russia, India.... used you, or one of your peers doing the same. This is taking off my shoes at the airport levels of stupid and ineffective.

I spend a fair bit of time talking to C-levels. The bulk of them use your services not because they think they are effective but because they know that they can point the finger at you when the shit hits the fan.

But you are spying on users?

I wouldn’t lead with this in the marketing. It’s entirely disturbing.

You're supposed to spy on an organization's users and machines for the benefit of the organization that has contracted you. That's not what you're doing here. You've taken an adversarial relationship with your (potential) customer, acting to harm them.

Presumably legal, but morally gray.

A lot of us are missing what actually happened here.

Some random person downloaded Huntress to try it out. Not a company. Not through IT. Just clicked "start trial" like you might with any software. Were they trying to figure out how to get around it? We have no idea!

Huntress employees then decided - based on a hostname that matched something in their private database - to watch everything this person did for three months. Their browser history, their work patterns, what tools they used, when they took breaks.

Then they published it.

The "but EDR needs these permissions!" comments are completely missing the point. Yeah, we know EDR is basically spyware. The issue is that Huntress engineers personally have access to trial user data and apparently just... browse it when they feel like it? Based on hostname matches???

Think about what they're saying: they run every trial signup against their threat intel database. If you match their criteria - which could be as weak as a hostname collision - their engineers start watching you. No warrant. No customer requesting it. No notification. Just "this looks interesting, let's see what they're up to."

Their ToS probably says something vague about "security monitoring" but I doubt it says "we reserve the right to extensively surveil individual trial users for months and publish the results if we think you're suspicious." And even if it did, that doesn't make it right or legal.

They got lucky this time - caught an actual attacker. But what about next time? What about the security researcher whose hostname happens to match? The pentester evaluating their product? Hell, what about corporate users whose hostname accidentally matches something in their database?

The fact that they thought publishing this was a good idea tells you a lot. This isn't some one-off investigation. This is apparently? how they operate.

> caught an actual attacker. But what about next time?

What about the time before this where it wasn't an attacker, so they didn't write an article about it, and so we never found out about it?

Why would they NOT do this? They are a fucking cyber security company. It should be no surprise to anyone that a company that specializes in endpoint security software would be analyzing this shit non-stop, even for trial versions that users run. That's how their software works!

"Why wouldn't a locksmith make copies of all their customers' keys? They're a fucking locksmith company!"

Having technical capability doesn't create ethical permission.

The distinction between "can" and "should" is fundamental to data governance - a concept that exists precisely because unrestricted access to customer data, even for security purposes, creates massive ethical and legal problems.

Huntress didn't monitor a contracted customer's systems for that customer's benefit. They surveilled a trial user for three months based on a hostname match, then published the results. That's not "how their software works" - that's a choice about how to use the access their software provides.

If you genuinely can't see the difference between contracted security monitoring and opportunistic surveillance of trial users, you shouldn't be commenting on security practices at all, let alone so confidently.

I don't understand how "we actively spy on our customers and blog about it" is a viable marketing strategy..?

Presumably this

> We knew this was an adversary, rather than a legitimate user, based on several telling clues. The standout red flag was that the unique machine name used by the individual was the same as one that we had tracked in several incidents prior to them installing the agent.

So in any other context, they probably wouldn't do any digging into the machine or user history, but they did this time because they already had high confidence of malicious use from this endpoint.

The cybersecurity industry is dominated by companies who sell this as their "cyber threat intelligence" and "real-time protection" special sauce.

Cool insight into a (novice?) threat actor's operations and tooling. I personally knew nothing of "residential proxies" like LunaProxy so I learned something new

I personally would be careful about that sort of thing. I would imagine that few people would want to run a proxy on their home computer that can be accessed by others - and if they did, they'd probably have a specific reason for it, and thus would be looking for specific ways to make that proxy available to the people who they feel would want to use it.

So, I can only assume that a lot of residential machines that have proxies on them offered by companies like these have actually had those proxies installed by malware. The company themselves may not even be aware of this.

(I'm not saying that LunaProxy in particular is like this. I actually have never heard of LunaProxy before now, so the above may not even apply to it. Regardless, it's still worth applying caution.)

Reading through the article, the "hacker" was pretty naive and junior, installing an EDR on his hacking box. Or it was just a way to distract you guys ;)

I caught that feeling through the whole article. Like, was this user really that distracted or inept to forget he installed a Huntress trial, or was this all for some larger, more insidious reason, or distraction?

Ahh yes, 4D chess

Unrelated story; how politician gave us a look into their financial adventures.

I am curious where the red line is.

Any criminal activity or just behavior that the analysts find interesting?

After thinking of it for a while, I do not think it is such a big issue. The threat actor was probably an adversary to existing huntress customers and the EDR probably reacted to his tooling and mistakes.

When doing red team engagements, we do the same, install same security solutions as the customer and work around it. It could be what happened here?

That the analysts spotted him and were able to connect it to existing cases is just good craftsmanship.

I no longer feel that it’s relevant to discuss a red line here. Huntress just did their job.

Having worked in the computer security world for many years and been completely on board with the "it's good to open source attack tools so that everyone knows what can be done", it's still sometimes hard not to feel like a useful idiot when I see attackers operating with big stacks of almost all open source tooling that are now mature and full featured enough to make almost any skid into a decently effective procurer and vendor of stolen information with a bit of effort.

I've been through 2 offensive courses (SANS GPEN and Parrot Labs Offensive Methodology and Analysis) and yeah, that was the take I got even back then (5+ years ago). Everything we used was open source and near-fully functional. There was a lot of knowledge needed on the syntax for some tools, but otherwise it was insane to think how easily these could be used by a motivated person.

For some of them, it makes sense. Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, and similar tools are good because they can be used to give people a good idea of the impact of the vulnerabilities in their system as well as giving them knowledge of the TTPs that attackers use.

But some of these, like Bloodhound are not really telling you much you didn't know. They are tools to make exploiting access, whether authorized or otherwise, easier and more automated. Hell, even in the case of Cobalt Strike, they are doing their best to limit who can obtain it and chasing down rogue copies because used for real attack purposes.

I'm not really saying anything should (or can) be done about this. Just ruminating about it, as after many years in the industry, seeing a list of a mostly open source stack used for every aspect of cybercrime sometimes surprises me at just how good a job we've done of equipping malicious actors. For all the high minded talk of making everyone more secure, a lot of things just seem to be done for a mixture of bragging rights ego and sharing things with each other to make our offensive sec job a bit easier.

While amusing it probably isn't particularly informative.

A person like that obviously has extremely poor operational security and is therefore of low competence.

Competent actors likely utilize virtualization or in cases where the software is adversarial and may reveal virtualization, physical machines (eg. cheap Mini PC's) with isolated and managed networks (eg. connections routed through a commercial VPN or a residential proxy) not under the control of the machine.

Also styxmmarket doesn't appear to be in any way a dark web marketplace/forum. It doesn't even have an onion address? It has a .com domain, something that should be easy for the authorities to seize. Probably is a honeypot of some kind.

A bunch of commenters are confused how this "blunder" even happened. I was too, except I recognized the company name. They have a history of making up or completely misunderstanding their own software. They make EDR products which trigger "events" except they don't really have the knowledge to triage them, so they come up with wild explanations for them that involve threat actors and anomalies which are not real. For example, earlier they posted this to their Twitter account: https://twitter.com/HuntressLabs/status/1865111713948852572

Anyone who knows anything about macOS knows that it is not possible to disable System Integrity Protection without rebooting into recovery (an environment that it is not possible to actually get events from). So their "detection" is just some random guy typing "csrutil disable" in their terminal and it doing absolutely nothing. I would not be surprised if there is some similar dumb explanation here that they missed, which would make for a substantially less interesting story.

> Like most good stories, this one starts in the middle and works its way back and forth

Don't tell me your story is "good," let me read it and I'll be the judge of that.

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