Is this actually accurate? Packages with weekly downloads in the hundreds of thousands, yet in the 4+ hours that the malicious versions were up for, not a single person updated any of them to the latest patch release?
Is this actually accurate? Packages with weekly downloads in the hundreds of thousands, yet in the 4+ hours that the malicious versions were up for, not a single person updated any of them to the latest patch release?
Microsoft has been bravely saying "Security is top priority" since 2002 (https://www.cnet.com/tech/tech-industry/gates-security-is-to...) and every now and then reminds us that they put "security above all else" (latest in 2024: https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/05/03/prioritizing-sec...), yet things like this persists.
For how long time do Microsoft need to leave wide-open holes for the government to crack down on their wilful ignorance? Unless people go to jail, literally nothing will happen.
npm stats lag. We observed installs while the malicious versions were live for hours before removal. Affected releases we saw: duckdb@1.3.3, @duckdb/duckdb-wasm@1.29.2, @duckdb/node-api@1.3.3, @duckdb/node-bindings@1.3.3. Same payload as yesterday’s Qix compromise. Recommend pinning and avoiding those versions, reviewing diffs, and considering a temporary policy not to auto-adopt fresh patch releases on critical packages until they age.
I also know projects who are reading the update feeds and kick off CI jobs after any dependencies are updated to automatically test version upgrades, surely at least one dependent of DuckDB is doing something similar.