Setup and forget is never good for security. From what I see with sslboard.com (I'm the founder), all hosts serving old expired certificates also have bad TLS versions and ciphers (RC4, DES) and vulnerabilities.
Where is this? Why would bad encryption be better than plaintext? I can't imagine a scenario where this is the case.
This is strictly better than plaintext as a passive eavesdropper cannot listen in; an active attack is needed.
I wrote much more here: https://alexsci.com/blog/is-email-confidential-in-transit-ye...
I honestly don't know if I fully buy that argument, but there's something to be said for the idea that the problem with "better than nothing" is that it presupposes "nothing" is what you'd otherwise end up with and the crummy solution is the best you're going to get. I think your blog post highlights this point. Encrypting email even without validating certificates is better than not doing the encryption at all, but is giving people the security blanket of "at least we're doing something" slowing down the process of taking that last step?
The browser limits on maximum certificate lifetimes only apply to the public web PKI, not to CAs that you configure yourself.
When creating your CA certificate you can hop into the Advanced tab and add the following line to constrain it to specific domains. This eliminates the risk of your likely-poorly-secured CA being abused to MITM all of your communications:
nameConstraints=critical,permitted;DNS:.home.internal
This will only allow CA to sign certificates for *.home.internal. I think browser support for nameConstraints is pretty good these days but some clients might not be compatible and you can always install a CA certificate without this extension on devices that don't support it.