What this tells me however is there are a lot of people trying to attack SGX still today, and Intel has improved their response a lot.

The main issue with SGX was that its initial designed use for client-side DRM was flawed by the fact you can't expect normal people to update their BIOS (meaning downloading update, putting it on a storage device, rebooting, going into BIOS, updating, etc) each time an update is pushed (and adoption wasn't good enough for that), it is however having a lot of use server-side for finance, auto industry and others.

We are also planning to support other TEE in the future, SGX is the most well known and battle tested today, with a lot of support by software like openenclave, making it a good initial target.

If you do know of any 0-day exploit currently live on SGX, please give me more details, and if it's something not yet published please contact us directly at security@vp.net

Once they are leaked, there is no going back for that secret seed - i.e. that physical CPU. And this attack is entirely offline, so Intel doesn't know which CPUs have had their seeds leaked.

In other words, every time there is a vulnerability like this, no CPU affected can ever be trusted again for attestation purposes. That is rather impractical - so I'd consider even if you trust Intel (unlikely if you consider a government that can coerce Intel to be part of your threat model), SGX provides rather a weak guarantee against well-resourced adversaries (such as the US government).