1) Palantir was the first breath of fresh air that brought actually good tech with modern tech support practices to the warfighter, and by extension put the big defense contractors on notice. I personally believe this impact was tremendously important as there were real safety connotations involved, and anyone with a family member downrange could appreciate this.
2) Palantir was great targeting software that worked like modern tech vs a custom Linux distro with a GUI from 1970 and required 5 months of finagling to get vendor support for.
So Palantir just brought standard 2010’s tech to soldiers betting their safety on it. This was incredible although ordinary.
I'm sure it was very shiny looking software though, but that doesn't mean it's good.
You’d be mistaken to think of me as a fan. But, I understand, I think you miss, what Palantir did as a net positive for defense acquisitions and the very legitimate impact on warfigter safety. And, how huge of an achievement it was, given what vendor impact on basic military’ing in the 2000-2010’s was like.
Also, good or bad, all this modern defense innovation new American Century VC stuff, which good or bad is part of the tech industry and it’s continued stability, in my mind sources from this break through.
Also, maybe the software tracked down an IED network or two. And that means there are some limbs on Americans that aren’t robotic. Pretty great too.
The other takeaway is tech used to target insurgents is now getting American citizen data.
The very uncomfortable truth here is that Israel is demonstrating how to effectively destroy insurgencies in Gaza and Lebanon. You cannot pussyfoot with nasty, brutal tactics and expect to accomplish anything. This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars, and we seem to have collectively forgot it again.
The US fought for 20 years, could never eliminate the insurgency, and then withdrew with its tail between its legs, leaving the old government to come back to power.
Yes, if you kill 10%, 20%, 30% of the population, maybe you'll eventually destroy the insurgency, though that approach hasn't worked yet for Israel in Gaza. But if you're not completely genocidal, that's not an option.
> This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars
The world wars were not counterinsurgency operations (except from the German and Japanese side in the occupied countries). They were traditional wars between major powers.
These are more not remotely similar situations.
What is the ideology that is even supposed to be eliminated in Gaza? Killing people who are oppressed is not going to make them start loving their oppressors.
Saying "but they were nazis" is no different that when the Hamas explains that every Israeli civilian is a soldier to justify their actions.
[0]https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rape_during_the_occupation_o...
> The very uncomfortable truth here is that Israel is demonstrating how to effectively destroy insurgencies in Gaza and Lebanon.
Neither Gaza nor Lebanon are insurgencies - Israel is trying to destroy terrorist organizations, not rebellions.
> You cannot pussyfoot with nasty, brutal tactics and expect to accomplish anything. This was a lesson the west learned in the world wars, and we seem to have collectively forgot it again.
Neither world war was either an insurgencies nor a war on a terrorist organization, so unclear why this is a relevant example at all.
A better example of how to win that type of war would be the Malay insurgency (especially when compared to your example of the Vietnam war)
Terrorism and insurgency are not mutually exclusive.
The classic example of a modern insurgency, the Algerian resistance against the French, was led by a terrorist organization, the Front de libération nationale (FLN). More correctly, it was a political organization that used terrorism as a tactic, and which eventually became the government of an independent country.
Hamas is a pretty similar case to the FLN (though the PLO was more similar in the old days, in terms of ideology).
Israel is getting sucked into their own quagmire right now as we speak and is taking on an expensive ground invasion and occupation of a territory they don't want to be in (like we did) for an unforeseeable amount of time, over a hostile population, against the advice of their own military leaders. They are also actively starving civilians, who are at this very moment dying of malnutrition in scores every week.
It's easy to win the brute force battle with money in the modern world. But wars aren't about destroying things and people with brute force. They are about achieving political objectives. That's what we failed to understand in Afghanistan and Iraq and what Israel failed to learn from our failures in those regions
Israel didn't suppress anything in Gaza so far, and for sure the next generation of insurgents (not necessarily Hamas) who have nothing to lose since Israel destroyed their homes and killed their families is being cultivated right now. This is why now the government talks openly about their own "final solution"[0][1], as they know that it will be difficult if not impossible to stabilize the situation.
[0]https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-15/ty-article/.p...
[1]https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/05/06/smotrich-sees-gaza-de...
How to do counterinsurgency, as I ran into it from the “what works” angle in the formal setting to learn these things.
- the Malaya/British example. Notably Britain doesn’t run Malaya anymore and that country doesn’t exist. This is the direction you’re arguing works fwiw
- COIN and Patraeus (sp), assuming conditions were correct across the board and you could get a unit commander and all related stakeholders to try it. Notably we didn’t “win the insurgency” in Afghanistan
So there are both well established COIN case studies, one heavy and one light, both didn’t work, and no overlap with what you’re arguing.
But what the Army, Marines, and all the Air Force can’t do: nation-building.
What the State Dept is supposed to do but didn’t: nation building
What congress never really bothered to do per the Constitution: a non half-assed attempt at routine approval and review to authorize the use of military force
What the public did: super bowls and tech boom, poor people and idealists go to war
What senior officers did: another 18 months of warring and I get a deployment patch and strategic command
What your line officers and NCOs did: love a combat tour, pay and patch, but how much do we dig into the bigger picture mission and put ourselves at risk on (check notes) War Year 19 Strategy #807
Lot of reasons!