The Truth About Convertible Debt and The Hidden Terms You Didn’t Understand
bothsidesofthetable.com
bothsidesofthetable.com
Relevant Lectures: http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-431... http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-431...
For example: The purchasers of the next round would be idiots to let the first investor execute the equivalent of a full ratchet, and all such provisions are usually throw-aways in a negotiation.
And how is the next investor incentivized to let that occur?
Edit: I should be more explicit. The next investor is anti-incentivized to let it occur, which is why it gets negotiated away by sensible investors.
1. They often don’t have control provisions. With equity often investors want “blocking rights on a sale or future finaning” that they often don’t get in a convertible debt deal. If this is the reason you’re doing it, then perhaps talk to investors about whether they’d be willing to give up that right in a Series Seed equity deal.
2. They often don’t have board seats attached to them. Again, this should be negotiable with a Series Seed.
--Summary of the argument.
The rest of the article is useful, too. It provides good background and context for his conclusions.