I'd like to see zoning opened back up for increasing density wherever it's needed, but I would also like to see a strong social housing policy.
Can you explain the mechanism by which accumulating vacant houses would provide the same reward structure as crypto speculation?
Besides that speculators can also withhold supply, artificially inflating prices. 2008 occurred due to speculation, independent of NIMBY regulation.
As for crypto, housing can actually be more profitable than crypto since investors see rentier income not just speculative appreciation.
Ultimately, this isn't just a supply-and-demand problem in an idealized market. It's a resource allocation issue where investors with significant capital can hoard housing, driving up costs, while many people struggle with homelessness. Simply greasing the market with deregulation won't solve this fundamental imbalance.
In other words you are looking at it from a supply side but ignoring the wealth distribution of buyers. Wealth has further concentrated among the richest buyers over the past few years, while the poorest have grown poor, leading to higher prices for everyone. That’s the cause, not NIMBYism, which has been around forever. It’s a wealth redistribution issue not a deregulation issue.
House vacancies aren’t my central argument however - they are a symptom of the wealth distribution problem causing our housing crisis.
It's fine if you just don't have an answer. But then my point is: nobody seems to have an answer about how this is supposed to work.
You're clearly trying to route around the question and answer some broader question I didn't ask about how the overall housing market works. I'm not interested. I asked: how can investors make money on this? Your answer is: they don't; they lose money, but I guess do it anyways in order to twirl their mustaches.
Investors can make money on price fluctuations and rent. And supply increases are neither immediate nor endless, despite what a simplistic model would hold.
Sadly we need structural solutions not superficial answers to the housing crisis.
And investors providing rentals contribute to supply also, sure. Yet pricing power among suppliers plays a role here as well.
My argument is not that increasing YIMBYism is bad, but that it is a meager half measure that can at best nudge housing prices, not fix the essential problem.
For example, even with a completely efficient and housing supply, with housing selling at cost, people would still be homeless, as homeless people lack money to pay for housing at cost. By ignoring the wealth composition of buyers, we can at best make housing more elastic through YIMBYism, applying a bandaid rather than fundamentally addressing the housing problem itself.
It depends on the circumstances of the market. Imagine an extreme hypothetical example, where one investor owns 90 out of 100 houses. And one new house is built every ten years. That investor has pricing power. They can essentially charge whatever they want even if it’s means some houses they own are empty (withholding supply). So: it depends on how fast new houses enter the market versus how much pricing power the investor possesses.
(In fact YIMBY doesn’t create an endless new supply. The idea is that it deregulates, facilitating a new supply where there wasn’t one before. That doesn’t constitute an endless supply, just a new one-time shift allowing a finite boost of additional supply.)
Another example: consider a speculative bubble. In a speculative bubble an investor can purchase a house, it can stay empty, there can be new supply coming into the market, but the forces of froth can outpace the force of additional supply, for quite some time. If they sell before the bubble pops, they profit.
Both these examples are of investors withholding supply, new supply coming into the market, and still profiting. Whether prices fall comes down to whether the downward force of new supply outstrips other forces that boost prices.
OK.
This describes zero investors anywhere in the country. There is no significant market in the US where investors owns even a significant percentage of all houses (the total in California is 19%, and that statistic is dominated by mom-and-pop house speculators that can't buy even two more houses, let alone keep up with continuous added supply).
I'm fine with the idea that we've played this out now. Maybe someone else has a better idea of how investors can beat zoning reform, but for now I'm going to go back to assuming that investors are immaterial to housing scarcity.
The 19% stat & the mom-and-pop claim you are referring to is actually misleading for our discussion.
> This study included properties for short-term or long-term rentals, second homes, and vacation retreats but did not follow condos or build-to-rent single-family-home projects.
So it only refers to a subset of the housing market. For a better idea of the pricing power investors have we need to include other kinds of rentals. Also from the article:
> Census Bureau stats show 45% of households live in a place they don’t own, the third-highest share of tenants nationally.
The vast majority of that 45% is multifamily housing, which is typically owned by institutions.
This shows a broader picture of the housing market in California. There is huge institutional ownership of housing. It’s far from implausible that these investors lack pricing power.
Sprawl chews up more and more farmland and forest, lengthens commutes, increases congestion. There's enough subdivisions and single family neighborhoods already.