For some examples, Rust (although this is not specific to it) uses stack guard pages to detect stack overflows by _forcing_ a segfault (as opposed to reading/writing arbitrary memory after the usual stack). Some JVMs also expect and handle segfaults when dereferencing null pointers, to avoid always paying the cost for checking them.
The violation occurs if the program keeps running after having violated a memory safety property. If the program terminates, then it can still be memory safe in the definition.
Segfaults has nothing to do with the properties. There's some languages or some contexts in which segfaults is part of the discussion, but in general, the theory doesn't care about segfaults.
I don't know what you're trying to say here. C would also be memory-safe if the program just simply stopped after violating memory safety, but it doesn't necessarily do that, so it's not memory safe. And neither is Go.
The only reason this isn't a more critical issue is because data races are hard to exploit and there aren't lot of concurrent Go programs/system libraries that accept lot of attacker controlled inputs.
What you can say though (and the point I made upthread) is that if a language manages to provably never segfault, then it must have some sort of true language-enforced safety because the difference between segfaulting or not is really just a matter of granularity.
> Rust has, unfortunately, changed the narrative so that people now believe memory safety is a property of the language, when it is one of the implementation.
I am not sure I agree with that (the concept of memory-safe languages looong predates Rust), but you can just define a memory-safe language as one where all conforming implementations are memory-safe -- making it a feature of the language itself, not just a feature of a particular implementation.
Memory safe languages make it harder to segfault but that's a consequence, not the primary goal. Segfaults are just another memory protection. If memory bugs only ever resulted in segfaults the instant constraints are violated, the hardware protections would be "good enough" and we wouldn't care the same way about language design.
The document is backed by foreign government as well.
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Dec/06/2003352724/-1/-1/0/THE...
You did not even read the link the parent comment provided and are continuing with the same flawed argument.