Let's not assume self‑interested corporate monopoly rents are a necessary precondition for innovation, and let's drop the romanticized notion that statutory patent terms by themselves constitute a just moral bargain, because history shows substantial discovery emerging from publicly funded science, mission driven nonprofits, collaborative consortia, open licensing, prizes, and advance market commitments, so we should test which incentive mixes work rather than presuppose one. Your "people always win on a long enough timeline" line doesn't answer the moral question of avoidable deaths, irreversible morbidity, or financial ruin before expiry; inevitability ≠ adequacy, and harms incurred during exclusivity remain morally chargeable. Commercialization does not require locking invention behind maximal (often crude, lengthy) IP, there are workable paths via milestone or frontloaded prizes, targeted or indication specific exclusivities, compulsory or voluntary licensing, patent buyouts, tiered pricing, and public manufacturing backstops; optimal mixes will and should differ across high‑income vs low and middle income country purchasing power. The "7‑year wait" is factually thin: statutory patent term is ~20 years from filing, while effective market exclusivity depends on regulatory data protections, biologic exclusivities, secondary or evergreening patents, litigation delays, and manufacturing barriers; patients routinely face restricted access even after nominal expiry. We also shouldn't conflate discovery scientists with development firms, nor firms with shareholders; in practice, salaried scientific labor is often alienated from downstream pricing power while financialization channels can parasitically extract surplus that need not translate into new R&D. Because many medicines and virtually all software have low marginal production cost relative to monopoly price, large deadweight losses arise when willing buyers are priced out, a staggering public welfare loss (and no, "deadweight" is not necessarily a synonym for "people you dislike"). Reading int_19h's rent‑extraction critique as a demand for Soviet central planning, and pivoting to talk of scientists as "spoils of war", is a straw man and a red herring that dodges the pricing structure at issue. If you want to defend the patent regime as a "social contract," we need to see the reciprocal side, access safeguards, anti‑evergreening enforcement, affordability commitments, otherwise it's a moral bargain in name only. Claiming membership among the "enlightened" means actually shedding light on these failures.