I think this is a core reason why containers have such a horrible security track record.
They weren't made by design.
One of the large problems is that there is no "create_container(2)". There are 8? different namespaces in conjunction with cgroups that make up "containers" and they are infinitely configurable. This is problematic and a core reason why we see container escapes almost every other month. Just look at user namespaces - some people use them and some people don't, but it was just a few months ago when multiple bypasses were published for them.
In k8s as an example, if you share your PID namespace in a pod, which is a simple config option, you can arbitrarily enter other pod member FS tree with /proc/PID/root, only protected by Unix permissions.
Without seacomp, capabilities, SELinux etc... anyone who can launch a docker container can use the --privlaged flag and change host firmware or view any filesystem including the hosts root.
Focusing on namespace breakout only misses most of the attack surface.