This way, malware authors would have to choose between making things easier for researchers or targeting far fewer people.
Either way, everyone except the malware creators wins.
This way, malware authors would have to choose between making things easier for researchers or targeting far fewer people.
Either way, everyone except the malware creators wins.
It's a pretty neat system; runs Doom, so we know it's production ready; and the source is meticulously organized.
The docs try to be overly general, IMHO, clouding the core ideas. If you're interested, I recommend just spinning up a VM and mucking about, along with the user guide.
Or perhaps the other way around?
That is making VMs totally unaware they've been virtualised, as I believe IBM's lpars work…
The solution really does seem like implementing those same hooks in non-VM environments, but preventing their actual usage behind permissions. In a VM, the permissions could genuinely be granted or denied. In a non-VM they would always be denied. But malware could never be able to tell why it was denied permission.
This is a huge, huge, huge amount of work. Even the most obvious things -- like "can you run a VM?" -- can require huge support, in that case even from the hardware, when you want to do them within a VM.