> I once asked a U.S. cybersecurity executive how his company handled the banned-documents problem in the context of securing the networks of their own clients. His answer: They would assign U.S. leaks to British analysts and leaked U.K. documents to American analysts.
But mostly the article is a simplistic attack on a simplistic policy, by a (claimed) John Hopkins professor in this area. Very heavy on how the current policy makes his life in academia more difficult. Minimal interest in what workable improvements (from the US Nat'l Security Establishment's PoV) would look like. And scarcely a mention that the whole problem would be far smaller if our Establishment was less shitty at preventing leaks of its secret documents.
EDIT/Responses:
(Dylan16807) Yes, small picture, the leaks are a different topic. But at the "professor of strategic studies" level, arguing for changes in national security policy - maybe he should pay more attention to the bigger picture? That could include mention of the degree to which "simplistic idiocy" security policies discourage and demotivate the young people who our Establishment needs as responsible clerks handling its secret documents.
(cowsandmilk) The "(claimed)" is a sarcastic dig - at the sophisticated worldview which he should bring to this subject, vs. the simplistic way he presents in the article.