> It assumes consciousness arises from purely physical interactions AND that any physical process can be computed AND that computation can produce consciousness
Yes, and with these assumptions, then "We've established that computers can be conscious, so LLMs might be".
Again that is all that is being claimed. The one insisting the argument is anything more persuasive than that is you. You seem hung up on this claim, but need I remind you it's only an existence proof, whether it's actually possible/probable/likely is an entirely different claim, and is not what is being claimed.
> Even if consciousness arises from a physical system, it doesn't follow that computation on a physical substrate can produce consciousness
> If consciousness arises from a physical system, a physical system cannot produce consciousness
> If A not A
This argument is a contradiction, it's incoherent.
If you're trying to draw a distinction between physical systems and computation on physical systems, well that's a moot point as every tested theory in physics uses mathematics that is computable.
Perhaps reality is not computable. If so then yes, that would mean computation alone will not produce the same kind of consciousness we have. That leaves open other kinds of consciousness, but that's another discussion.