The issue isn't the mere existence of spyware companies globally. The issue is that Israeli companies in particular have cornered the market on selling to the world's worst human rights abusers, with catastrophic consequences.
Let's be specific: NSO Group sold Pegasus to Saudi Arabia, who used it to track Jamal Khashoggi's inner circle before his assassination. They sold to Mexico, where it was used to target journalists' families within days of their murders. To Rwanda, to hunt dissidents abroad after imprisoning their family. The list goes on.
This isn't cherry-picking. When Citizen Lab analyzes global sypware operations, Israeli companies dominate: NSO, Candiru, Paragon, QuaDream, and arguably Cytrox (Macedonian, but Israeli leadership and investors). The common thread? Former Unit 8200 personnel, who've turned state cyber-warfare capabilities into a business model explicitly built on selling to authoritarians.
Your "but everyone does it" framing fundamentally misrepresents the issue. Yes, other countries have surveillance companies. But there's a massive difference between developing capabilities and systematically selling them to regimes that murder journalists. WHen was the last time a German or French company's tools were found on a murdered journalist's or imprisoned political dissident's phone?
The data shows Israeli companies don't just happen to have "bad PR" (or uniquely terrible luck in choosing their clients) - they actively court authoritarian clients because that's where the money is if you have no morals.
For some context: Israel has a population of less than 10 Million - less than 0.1% of the world's population. If you have a persuasive argument for why Israeli spyware is routinely found by organizations like Citizen Lab, why their products seem so uniquely popular and successful with fascists and authoritarians, I'd love to hear it. Because from where I'm standing, the clear and obvious explanation is that there is a deep, systemic issue in the Israeli private intelligence and cybersecurity sector that is entirely unconcerned with how their tools will be used, or by whom, as long as the money's right. All enabled by the Israeli authorities, who need to approve of these exports.
You're right that spyware companies exist elsewhere. But when researchers keep finding the same tiny country's products in the phones of murdered journalists and jailed activists, dismissing scrutiny as bias is itself a bias. The question isn't why Israeli companies get attention - it's why they keep selling to regimes that use their tools to crush dissent, and worse.