Trump's 'Golden Dome' plan has a major obstacle: Physics
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It is a dumb idea.
BUT.
The people saying that it is difficult or impossible because of "PhYsIcS" are operating on information that was true when they were young researchers/students studying the state of the art at that time.
Now they are old, and things have changed.
Targets approaching a modern ABM platform at 2-7km/s can be engaged with a very high chance of success. It's not even that expensive. The Patriots in Ukraine can do it.
This isn't my opinion it is fact. There are photographs of the shattered remains of Russian MRBMs with approach velocities of 6km/s littering the Ukranian countryside.
It would take additional research and development to move 10km/s intercepts from "experimental but possible" to "very high probability" bin. R&D that is expensive, but not impossible.
I say 10km/s because russia is targeting 10km/s for all of their new wonder weapons. They are targeting 10km/s because they, like I, know that practically anything <10km/s is "doable".
It is not the 90s anymore.
Missiles like the Zircon, Iskander and Oreshnik are not going 7km/s when they are being intercepted. It's doubtful they're even going 2km/s too; these are standoff missiles with a solid-fuel motor and bleed their speed immediately from the moment the motor dies. Many ballistic missiles with onboard targeting also have to decelerate below Mach 4 for the terminal phase, otherwise the plasma shroud on the airframe prevents pretty much anything besides INS from guiding the rocket. And INS isn't really suitable for non-nuclear strikes.
On paper, it might be possible for something like Avengard to get intercepted close to 7km/s. But Avengard is also meant to maneuver and exploit the Patriot's directional radar, which means it might not even see it by the time it's too late. Comparing the interceptor to maximum speeds feels like the wrong way to assess how much of a threat these weapons are.
> It would take additional research and development to move 10km/s intercepts from "experimental but possible" to "very high probability" bin.
Poor Gorbachev is rolling in his grave. "Additional research" is the understatement of the century, and intercept probability has been less of an issue than magazine depth since the deployment of the R-36. If you have an 80% chance to intercept 10 warheads aimed at New York, you've already lost the battle. And that's just one missile, out of potentially hundreds that could be salvoed in a wartime situation. This was clear even back during the development of the SPRINT interceptor.
This gives you two options; build 50,000 ground interceptors to stop a worst-case scenario, or, escalate the conflict to space to disable missiles before they reach the terminal phase. Both options suck balls! Yes, it is "physically possible" in both cases, albeit at great cost to the American people in prestige and capital that could be spent on strategic arms reduction elsewhere.
> It is not the 90s anymore.
I don't see what you're getting at here. The technology advancements we've made in ABM tech since the 90s isn't really profound. It's not nothing, either, but the physics side of the equation still oppresses any serious attempt at solving the problem. Is there any advancement in particular you're trying to highlight here?
The need for precise control and timing is true for plutonium implosion-style devices but not true for uranium gun-style ones. Gun-style detonators just need to smash two lumps of uranium together. You better hope the interceptor completely demolishes the aforementioned lumps of uranium instead of ramming one into the other.