Maybe I'm alone, but a pinkie-promise from Sam Altman does not confer any assurances about my data to me. It's about equally as reassuring as a singing telegram from Mark Zuckerberg dancing to a song about how secure WhatsApp is.
Maybe I'm alone, but a pinkie-promise from Sam Altman does not confer any assurances about my data to me. It's about equally as reassuring as a singing telegram from Mark Zuckerberg dancing to a song about how secure WhatsApp is.
It's well-established that the American IC, primarily NSA, collects a lot of metadata about internet traffic. There are some justifications for this and it's less bad in the age of ubiquitous TLS, but it generally sucks. However, legal protections against directly spying on the actual decrypted content of Americans are at least in theory stronger.
Snowden's leaks mentioned the NSA tapping inter-DC links of Google and Yahoo, so I doubt if they had to tap links that there's a ton of voluntary cooperation.
I'd also point out that trying to parse the unabridged prodigious output of the SlopGenerator9000 is a really hard task unless you also use LLMs to do it.
The input is what's interesting.
Though I’m inclined to believe the US gov can if OpenAI can.
The laws have changed since then and it's not for the better:
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/congress-passing-bill-th...
I was an SRE and SWE on technical infra at Google, specifically the logging infrastructure. I am under no gag order.
This was the point of the lots of the five eyes programs. Its not legal for the US to spy on its own citizens, but it isnt against the law for us to do to the Australians... Who are all to happy to reciprocate.
> Snowden's leaks mentioned the NSA tapping inter-DC links of Google and Yahoo...
Snowden's info wasn't really news for many of us who were paying attention in the aftermath of 9/11: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A (This was huge on slashdot at the time... )
If there were multiple agencies with billion dollar budgets and a belief that they had an absolute national security mandate to get a teapot into solar orbit, and to lie about it, I would believe there was enough porcelain up there to make a second asteroid belt.
Yeah, because the definition of collection was redefined to mean accessing the full content already stored on their systems, post-interception. It wasn't considered collected until an analyst views it. Metadata was a laughable dog and pony show that was part of the same legal shell games at the time, over a decade ago now.
That said, from an outsider's perspective it sounded like the IC did collectively erect robust guard rails such that access to information was generally controlled and audited. I felt like this broke down a bit once sharing 702 data with other federal agencies was expanded around the same time period.
These days, those guard rails might be the only thing standing in the way of democracy as we know it ending in the US. AI processing applied to full-take collection is terrifying, just ask the Chinese.
If a CIA spook is stalking you everywhere, documenting your every visible move or interaction, you probably would call that spying. Same applies to digital.
Also, teapot argument can be applied in reverse. We have all these documented open digital network systems everywhere, and you want to say that one the most unprofitable and certainly the most expensive to run system is somehow protecting all user data? That belief is based on what? At least selling data is based on evidence of the industry and on actual ToS'es of other similar corpos.
How? Scared criminals aren't going to make themselves easy to find. Three-letter spooks would almost certainly prefer to smoke-test a docile population than a paranoid one.
In fact, it kinda overwhelmingly seems like the opposite happens. Remember the 2015 San-Bernadino shooting that was pushed into the national news for no reason? Remember how the FBI bloviated about how hard it was to get information from an iPhone, 3 years after Tim Cook's assent to the PRISM program?
Stuff like this is almost certainly theater. If OpenAI perceived retention as a life-or-death issue, they would be screaming about this case from the top of their lungs. If the FBI percieved it as a life-or-death issue, we would never hear about it in our lifetimes. The dramatic and protracted public fights suggest to me that OpenAI simply wants an alibi. Some sort of user-story that smells like secure and private technology, but in actuality is very obviously neither.
On the contrary.
>Maybe I'm alone, but a pinkie-promise from Sam Altman does not confer any assurances about my data to me.
I think you're being unduly paranoid. /s
https://www.theverge.com/2024/6/13/24178079/openai-board-pau...
https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/the-real-story-behind-sam-altman...
Meta data and investigation.
> That's not something a search function can distinguish.
We know that it can narrow down hugely from the initial volume.
> It requires a human to sift through that data.
Yes, the point of collating, analysing, and searching data is not to make final judgements but to find targets for investigation by the available agents. That's the same reason we all use search engines, to narrow down, they never produce what we intend by intention alone, we still have to read the final results. Magic is still some way off.
You're acting as if we can automate humans out of the loop entirely, which would be a straw man. Is anyone saying we can get rid of the police or security agencies by using AI? Or perhaps AI will become the police, perhaps it will conduct traffic stops using driverless cars and robots? I suppose it could happen, though I'm not sure what the relevance would be here.
"Corporations and the US government are spending money on it, so it must be useful." Are you serious? Lmao.
Raw data with time-series significance is their absolute favorite. You might argue something like Google Maps data is "obfuscated by virtue of its banality" until you catch the right person in the wrong place. ChatGPT sessions are the same way, and it's going to be fed into aggregate surveillance systems in the way modern telecom and advertiser data is.
-After Boston, Paris, Manchester, and other attacks, post-mortems showed the perpetrators were already in government databases. Analysts simply didn’t connect the dots amid the flood of benign hits. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack
-Independent tallies suggest dozens of civilians killed for every intended high-value target in Yemen and Pakistan, largely because metadata mis-identifies phones that change pockets. https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/36962/pdf