I'm having trouble reconciling what you wrote here with that result. Also with my own experiences, not necessarily of finding kernel vulnerabilities (I haven't had any need to do that for the last couple years), but of rapidly comprehending and analyzing kernel code (which I do need to do), and realizing how potent that ability would have been on projects 10 years ago.
I think you're wrong about this.
Also if you throw these models at enough code bases, they will probably get lucky a couple times.. So far every claim I have seen didn’t stand up to rigorous scrutiny. People find one bug then inflate their findings and write articles that would make you think they are far more affective than reality and I am tired of this hype.
CURL had to stop accepting bounties after it found nearly all of em were just AI generated nonsense…
Also I stated that they indeed provide very large gains in certain areas. Like writing a fuzz harness and reversing binaries. I am not saying they have absolutely no utility I am simply tired of grifters attempting to inflate their findings for clout. Shit has gotten out of control.
If you can reliably get x% lucky finding vulnerabilities for Y$ cost, then you simply scale that up to find more vulnerabilities.
I want to stop being elliptical and just say directly: you have strange and counterfactual ideas about the security research community of the mid-aughts. 2006-2008 was the height of the security blogosphere. This stuff definitely had a huge community.