First, there's a strong reliance on metaphor—particularly with the holographic analogy and the idea of "entangled clusters" of attention. These images are evocative, but without clear definitions or mechanisms, it's hard to evaluate what they actually mean or how they differ from existing models. Are you proposing a literal physical substrate? Or is this purely a metaphor for distributed processing?
Second, the distinction you make between “Truth” as existential and “truth” as symbolic feels like it’s drawing a sharp binary that may not hold up. Symbolic systems (like mathematics or language) aren’t just “graffiti pens” on reality—they often reflect deep structural truths about the world and have predictive power. Dismissing symbolic or information-theoretic models entirely overlooks how symbolic representations can be causally embedded in and shaped by existential reality.
It’s useful to critique reductionism, but a full rejection of symbolic cognition as “not consciousness” needs more than metaphor to be convincing. Otherwise, the argument risks sounding profound without being precise.