Comment by amarcheschi | Hacker News Reader

Comment by amarcheschi | Hacker News Reader

it might be worth reading edri article on it https://edri.org/our-work/high-level-group-going-dark-outcom...

i've just yesterday uploaded my final essay for a uni course on ethics where i'm debating on chat control and i have to say that being unsatisfied with some commission moves is not enough. there would be a shitton to talk about, but i'll just leave here that:

-while chat control was being discussed, europol was already salivating at the thought of expanding the regulation scope to other crime areas (as they said, "all traffic is useful" or something like that)[1]

-the european commission bases his thesis on the efficacy on the data provided by thorn, but we don't have any actual information about the trustworthyness of this claims. the european commission refused to comply with a FOIA request and the ombudsman suggested to comply, but still the eu commission refused to protect commercial interest of thorn. eu ombudsman ruled the case as maladministration on behalf of the eu commission but it has no power to do anything else[2]. another foia request filed in a member state revealed some other documents that still do not give any insight to thorn software, so we can't trust it yet

-a few europol members moved to thorn, with one violating rules about conflict of interest [3]

[1] https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/29/europol-sought-unlimite...

[2] https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/189484

[3] https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/200017

Also: "Going Dark expert group – EU's surveillance forge" https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/going-dark-expert-gro...

> The EU Commission is hiding the participants of the #EUGoingDark group meetings. I have requested lists of participants several times, but so far have only received completely redacted documents. (My Toot on Mastodon.) All that is known is that police forces and secret services are represented. Despite the highly sensitive topics in terms of data protection and fundamental rights, the EU Data Protection Supervisor only has the status of an observer. NGOs are not allowed to take part in the group’s meetings. While fundamental rights are muted, the #EUGoingDark group is planning to influence the EU Parliament with targeted surveillance PR.

> #EUGoingDark is our label for an EU working group set up by the EU Commission in June 2023.

Oh, at least he discloses upfront that "going dark" is an unofficial slogan from the opposition. Not sure if that's necessary, "High Level Group on Access to Data for Effective Law Enforcement" sounds sinister enough already.

The official email of the High-Level Group (HLG) is EC-HLG-GOING-DARK@ec.europa.eu

https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/high-level-group-...

I do have to say that eu gets the names right at least

Interesting, thanks.

To make things worse, Denmark will take hold of the Presidency of the Council of EU from July to December. They are one of the main forces behind Chat Control.

Got any source? I thought it was primarily a Swedish commissioner (Ylva Johansson) pushing it. EDIT: I don't mean this as "I don't believe you", I just want to know more.

It is much more than just ylva Johansson, here's an interesting read about how she's just the "face" of it

https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/25/who-benefits-inside-the...

"No majority in the EU Council for Polish proposal that #ChatControl should remain voluntary and secure #E2EE encryption be exempted. https://netzpolitik.org/2025/interne-dokumente-polen-gibt-ei...

In autumn, the new Danish presidency will try to push through the original extreme version of #ChatControl 2.0"

https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/1145965873906841...

> Swedish commissioner (Ylva Johansson) pushing it

She has retired since. She faced major criticisms after refusing to meet any of the privacy focused NGOs and had regular meetings with Thorn, the US company selling surveillance software.

> the efficacy on the data provided by thorn, but we don't have any actual information about the trustworthyness of this claims

Why would we doubt these claims? North Korea, China, (Soviet) Russia, all of them were and are very effective at using surveillance against their population. Feel free to expand the examples, the list is not meant to be exhaustive.

Because thorn sells software to detect csam and has a commercial interest in making its software appear in the best way possible

We also doubt this claims because thorn might have published further data but guess what, we can't because there's no info about it

It is also reasonable to assume they use some kind of machine learning, (now we're entering speculation territory since we have few data about it) but the Ai act would require high risk ai systems - and I think a csam detection algorithm would be that - to comply with some requirements in regard to transparency for the product to be used

Already in the EU Spain, Poland and Hungary are illegally using Pegasus spyware to spy their own opposition politicians. Why they should settle less with lawful means if they already use illegal means.

That's some secret service or at least non public things though, what is being regulated is "clear day" practices

I know it's not the best, but still

And why do you think this regulation would stop abuse if it were made available? Poland has corrupted judges who were onboard with opposition spying.

"But the commission cannot do much – CBA [Central Anticorruption Bureau] management and the Constitutional Tribunal, packed with PiS [judges], are obstructing its proceedings. In such an environment, any work based on facts and merit is pretty much impossible.”"

https://balkaninsight.com/2025/02/25/pegasus-in-poland-a-fli...

Regulation is not to stop abuse of the law, regulation is made to say what can be done lawfully

But, in this case, we are not talking only about regulation, but having a law-mandated backdoor in the every device on the planet.

Stopping abuse is not to have that backdoor.

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