Why we can't have nice private TLD DNSSEC | Hacker News Reader

Why we can't have nice private TLD DNSSEC

egbert.net

21 pointsegberts15 comments

Ironically, Chrome treats me to:

  ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH

So the privacy of egbert.net is especially ensured?

Looks like safari and Firefox are supported

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=egbert.net

Apparently Chrome does not support secp521r1 EC/DH key exchange. secp521r1... should probably be avoided unless you're targeting FIPS standards (too much security, also designed by NSA) but "higher bits" apparently are sexier than having a more rigorous algorithm than x25519.

... or probably this is very intentional move to block Chrome?

I'd be interested to know how you traced this. I dove into the rabbit hole, and used ssllabs.com for a client browser check. I compared the client with the server to note that the server, very strict in its protocols, accepts only TLS v1.3 (check) and only a single CHACHA cipher (check) so I could not see why they were not connecting. Now I do see that Chrome only does ecdh secp384r1 or 256, but that was fine print, and I did not understand its importance.

An attempt to fetch the blog URL with http: also failed with a 404.

Anyway, I did find the blog article, dated May 2022, on the Wayback Machine, in two old snapshots, and attempting to take a snapshot today failed. The W3C Validator was able to fetch and parse anyway.

There was no particular indication of browser compatibility in the blog post. But a very opinionated piece on DNSSEC indeed.

Should be able to do something like an

OpenSsl s_client -connect egbert.net:443

And get more information.

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