Stranded Jet Skier Breaches Multimillion Dollar Security System At JFK Airport

In fact, I rarely hear of new deployments considering these technologies (though I'm sure there are plenty of them, as the companies are still in business).

JFK is a complex airport, I'm not aware of the specific length of the perimeter they are covering there, but it's likely between 8 and 15 miles of perimeter fence line. You need something with a high degree of reliability and false alarm immunity to make this work. This is especially true because the fact is that the probability of a real terrorist incursion is pretty low. So, the guards aren't going to stay actively engaged with reviewing alarms for very long if essentially 99.9% of what they see are all false alarm/no-action events.

Video analytics can be very reliable, but you can't rely on humans to weed out the false positives very effectively. I've heard of (heard of, as in been involved in replacing them) video analytics systems that generated hundreds of false alarms per night on similar sized deployments. Any human operator is going to quickly become immune to the alerts when they happen at that rate.

</sarcasm>

1. The FBI flew across the world to NZ. 2. They performed an assault on the Dotcom house with an armed chopper.

Not saying that you are wrong, but the posters sentence was textually correct.

However, I guess it doesn't sound so nice in the "tough stance against terrorism" as a "state of the art" defense system.

This line of logic is going the exact wrong way. In the case of a website, there are known exploiters out there stealing data and money continuously. If you have a hole it will be found and exploited with near 100% certainty. Further, fixing your hole doesn't hurt anyone and usually doesn't even inconvenience them.

Airport "security", on the other hand, is against a threat that never seems to materialize [1] and is massively inconvenient to everyone who uses the system. This sort of thing is just shadow chasing. "Oh noes! If terrorists could somehow weaponize rats, they would be able to utilize the sewer system! We better spend billions to lock down the sewers, ASAP!". This hole has been open for how long? And yet, no terrorist attacks. It's not worth investing the resources it would take to fill the hole because statistically there's no reason to believe it will ever be exploited by a terrorist.

[1] Relative to internet attacks, which are constant, terrorist attacks against the US are statistically non-existent. There are probably more cyber attacks on US websites in a single day than terrorist attacks committed on US soil in its entire history.

I'll add on top of his points:

- Online security presents a different threat model, in that your front door is immediately accessible to the entire world. Meatspace targets are inherently limited by geography and local access. Theoretical attacks on Internet infrastructure are far more likely to become actual attacks, once recognized, and automated patrolling for vulnerabilities is commonplace.

- By contrast, a massed, armed assault on any given piece of infrastructure requires planning, materiel, and forces. Outside of active combat / conflict regions (Iraq, Afghanistan, areas of the Middle East, Pakistan, India, and disrupted regions in Africa), the ability to effectively organize and marshal even a very small force (2-12 persons) has had a very low success rate. 9/11 was carried out by 20 persons, one of whom was intercepted (and several of whom were subject to surveillance and really should have been caught, see the Minnesota FBI offices investigations of Moussaoui). London's July 7, 2005 bombings were carried out by 4 individuals against a very soft target (52 deaths, ~700 casualties). The Madrid March 11, 2004 bombings, also against a soft target, (191 dead, 2050 injured) resulted in 29 arrests.

In the US an UK, since 9/11 (and excepting the 7/7 London attacks), there have been a smattering of incidents labeled "terrorist", of which most in the US were letter or pipe bomb, or single gunman mass shootings. Several plots (most consisting of 1-2 persons) were discovered and thwarted in early planning stages, presumably through communications surveillance. Several (the underwear bomber, two New York City car bombing attempts) reached execution but failed to succeed. And a few odd one-offs (small plane flown into a Texas office building).

In the UK, the bulk of incidents were domestic terrorism related to IRA splinter groups.

What you're proposing is a vast expenditure to address a potential, but in all evidence low-likelihood security hole, by a means that's much less effective than broader preemptive measures (comms intercepts, infiltration) or mitigating responses, while a target-rich environment full of far softer targets (other transport systems, schools, movie theaters, religious centers) which are being actively exploited remain.

It's a very, very poor resource allocation strategy.

It's also one that pits billions of dollars of response to thousands of terrorist planning, for no effective change in outcome.

They win.

PS I did not get lucky with google and ninja baine. Is that some new hipster meme?

It also implies that these people are dishonest and could probably be bought for a not-overly-large investment. Why even try to smuggle your bomb through the TSA checkpoint when you can have a TSA agent hand deliver it to you?

I did, however, take several criminal justice courses. Although I have no particular familiarity with New York law, the affirmative defense of "necessity" does indeed appear to be supported in that state (according to a brief Google search).

My original response was not meant to derail the conversation, only to point out that I highly doubt any prosecutor would let the case get anywhere near a court room in the first place.