This is a somewhat bleak picture of math. We also have the other phenomena of increasing simplicity. Both statements and proofs becoming more straightforward and simple after one has access to deeper mathematical constructions.
For example : Bezout's theorem would like to state that two curves of degree m, degree n would intersect in mn points. Except that you have two parallel lines intersecting at 0 instead of 1.1 =1 point, two disjoint circles intersect at 0 instead of 2.2=4 points, a line tangent to a circle intersecting at 1 point instead of 1.2=2 points. These exceptions merge into a simple picture once one goes to projective space, complex numbers and schemes. Complex numbers lead to lots of other instances of simplicity.
Similarly, proofs can become simple where before one had complicated ad-hoc reasoning.
Feynman once made the same point of laws of physics where in contrast to someone figuring out rules of chess by looking at games where they first figure out basic rules(how pieces move) and then moves to complex exceptions(en passant, pawn promotion), what often happens in physics is that different sets of rules for apparently distinct phenomena become aspects of a unity (ex: heat, light, sound were seen as distinct things but now are all seen as movements of particles; unification of electricity and magnetism).
Of course, this unification pursuit is never complete. Mathematics books/papers constantly seem to pull a rabbit out of a hat. This leads to 'motivation' questions for why such a construction/expression/definition was made. For a few of those questions, the answer only becomes clear after more research.
I think you need to be careful taking about "infinite" in the context of math. If the number of quantities, relationships etc is finite, so are all their combinations. Even things like the infinit-ude of available numbers might have fixed patterns that render their relevant properties effecively finite, and lead to further distinctions e.g finite vs countable, etc.
Personally, I feel like math has a bit of a legacy problem. It holds on to the conventions of an art that is very old, with very different initial assumptions at its conception, and this is now holding it back somehow. I lack the background to effectivly demonstrate this other than "Things I know/understand seem less intutive in standard mathenatical terms" e.g. generating functions and/or integrals feel easier to understand (to me) when you understand the, to be software-like 'loops'.
In fact, the idea of "constructivist math" seems (again, to me) to beg for a more algorithmic/computational approach.
In any case, if we stick with Riemann sums, there should be a strong relationship to Generating Functions (which there is).
> Generating functions in code are basically a rote repetition of the mathematical definitions
GFs with a mathematical basis may have, for example, set-theoretic definitions that are not similar to, say, Turing machines. Any non-constructivist math is automatically not like code.
Could you expand on this? I don't see maths as a language for quantities specifically (i.e. what does symmetry have to do with quantities).
> just too tedious (but not impossible) for a human being to work through the proof.
Already happened with the four colour theorem arguably.
That’s easily proven to be true. “Two plus two equals four” is a theorem, so is “three plus three equals six”, etc.