I expect your field is probably teeming with AI proposals or offers on how to manage vulnerabilities, but that is doubtful the way, because again it is adding complexity, and no classifier is perfect, especially when scanners fail to understand scanned applications and their threat models or environment.
Stop selling external scanners, start simplifying code? This will never work, of course, because security vendors sell the promise of security to those willing to buy it, in the form of add-on products and capabilities.
Empower people to ignore scanner reports without so much red tape? That would never work either, because megacorp wants compliance and reduced liability.
Build secure systems as opposed to cataloging and scoring flaws? That would never work, because building secure systems is hard, nature tends to favor otherwise.
Charge people for adding complexity and credit them for removing complexity? Sadly, there is no way to do that, especially since products must ship and quality is hard to observe, since it is often invisible and only surfaces when things are broken.
Off the top of my head, would be nice to require proof of exploitation, by adding CTF-like capabilities to apps, such that only if the flag is captured do we consider the report real. This places more burden on scanners, in that it is no longer enough to report an outdated library. Requiring some proof of exploitability reduces noise and increases SNR, reducing false positives. Naturally, not all vulnerabilities have working exploits, and scanners can never fully simulate an adversary, so we may get more false negatives, but at least we would not have to waste so much time upgrading pointless modules and breaking applications to appease a false report. So the idea is "here is a dummy asset, show me how you leaked or compromised it". Adding the dummy asset should be cheap, but would force scanners to better simulate an attack.
At the very least, there ought to be a knob to decrease scanner sensitivity.
There are far too many bad actors for us to operate as an industry with no yardstick.
its all just surface-level box-checking. most companies required to get 'penetration tests' just get an overpriced Nessus scan sold as a pentest and that meets their reqs.
Maybe I have a dependency on Foo which has a critical vulnerability in a feature that I don't use. I suppress the warning and all is well. Then two weeks later someone on my team decides to use that feature, not knowing that there's a problem with it. Now we're fucked, and we'll never know because the vulnerability has been suppressed.
Trump must be receiving a lot of emails from companies wanting to fill the void, and I bet the Trumpiest of them all is going to be awarded a contract worth 10x the budget CVE had, and do a much worse job.