Attack of the Acqui-hires
finance.fortune.cnn.com
finance.fortune.cnn.com
In general, the goal of Hacker School is to help people become dramatically better programmers, regardless of where they start. Some people come in without much programming experience, and some people come in with substantial programming experience. Across the board our students report that Hacker School is one of the most educational and productive periods of their lives (here's what a very experienced student wrote about her time in the current batch: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4335460)
Can I hijack this thread to ask -- seems like everyone who participated and posted about it wants to come back. How do you manage the exponential/fibonacci growth?
We actually had exponential growth for our first four batches, but that's not super impressive when you consider our first batch only had six students :)
In truth, every batch is an experiment, and each time we're terrified we won't get enough qualified applicants.
#edited to fix grammatical errors.
It is frequently got around with pretty slim "contracts" and generally the HRMC keep it in their back pocket for rainy days
I suspect the IRS will let an awful lot of acqui-hires go through so that they can pick off the obviously dodgy ones without finding them selves bogged down in masses of law suits with defensible "we really were bought out" and the horror of some bad precendants.
Because clearly the world would be a better place if financial agreements were more like indentured servitude.
Why are you assuming that "employees" will sign such contracts?
Suppose someone shows up to work. How does the court determine whether they're working per contract? (If someone says "I don't have any patentable inventions this month", do you think that they should be penalized?)
CA allows non-competes in certain circumstances.
Company B basically just hired all of Company A's employees for their existing salaries with no individual negotiation for raises or bonuses. Almost all of Company A stayed around to begin with because Company A had a lot of smart people who enjoyed working together, but within 6 months a lot of people (including myself) bounced from Company B for a whole host of reasons.
All in all, for me the situation was neutral. Company A was basically dead in the water without Company B anyway, but all that really happened for me is it delayed my having to find a new job for a few months. After deciding to leave Company B I quickly found a new job with a good raise over what I was making so that's cool.
Of course, YMMV, I'm sure every deal like this is very different.
It depends on the employee. The employees that the acquirer wants are treated differently than others.
Both are paid for their stock and vested options. "The wanted" may get retention bonuses, additional grants, etc.
> a raw deal for non-owners.
What do you mean by "non-owners"? Are you referring to employees without any options or stock or to folks that don't have much in the way of options/stock?
Stock/options owners are compensated per their ownership.
Of course, the interesting question is how well the stock/options owners are treated, and there are different classes, hence the whole section about VC liquidation preferences.
They get 1/10th the money that folks who own 10-20% get.
What do you think should happen?
There's only 100%. Some investors have liquidation preferences over others.
The buyer, of course, is free to give money to people post-deal as it sees fit.
That's engineer math, but not financier math.
People at 10-20% are in the room when terms are decided upon, people with 1-2% are typically not. There are a variety of mechanisms by which 1-2% of an acquisition can, in a few failure modes, evaluate to nothing.
Here's one: You own 1% (by current dilution) of a company. This company has not done well. There exists a company which wants to buy it.
The co-founders collectively own 60%, with approximately 30% being owned by investors, and approximately 10% held in aggregate by employees. You watch the M&A team, VC partners, and founders walk into a room. Two hours later, they walk out, and everyone looks fairly happy. You overhear the VC say "$20 million."
You think you're getting $200k, right?
Would it surprise you the next day when you're given a contract to sign and told that you've been allocated a $10k signing bonus with the new company? And that this is, by the way, it?
How the heck did that happen? The VCs were a little displeased with their return, since this company did poorly, so they played hardball with your founders. The VCs got $10 million. (Check those percentages again. Yeah. I know.) This represented 100% of the purchase price, and as it didn't clear the VC's liquidation preference, the common stock is valueless. You and the founders hold common stock. For their participation in the deal, the founders were guaranteed 3x $3 million signing bonuses with the acquirer. This leaves $1 million to pay the lawyers, cover the accountancy costs, etc etc etc. But hey, because you're such a nice guy, despite your options being worthless they fought hard for you and convinced the acquirer to cut a check for three whole months of your old salary.
You would be, of course, free to decline this bonus. The door is on your left.
And, to be fair, you did better than another 1% owner of the company -- employee #1, who went on to greener pastures a year ago. His shares have vested. But he was "disloyal" and "didn't stick it through", so hey, no check for him at all.
Engineers read the whole message, including the bit about liquidation preferences and doing things outside the deal.
Why do you find it unreasonable for different people to get different signing bonuses?
Note that they're not getting them because of ownership, but because of perceived value to the acquirer.
And we all know what happens when you try to hire away employees due to no-poach collusion, the hirer get's fired after Steve Jobs's email.