Moreover, since cost of qubits scale exponentially, a slight reduction in the power of a polynomial-time algorithm is not enough to offer a practical benefit.
You'd need to switch to a 384 bit hash function to keep a 128-bit security threshold. In practice, this means SHA-512.
I.e., that for n logical qubits, decoherence time goes down polynomially rather than e^(-a n)? AFAIK (and yes, I could be mistaken!) what we deal with is reducing a susbtantially.
1. It's a very lonely example.
2. It's not clear how big the market is for "you can break encryption from the past, but not current encryption, because once QCs arrive, everyone will obviously move away from QC-breakable encryption". And I'm not aware of any other reasons why factoring large numbers would be useful beyond breaking encryptions.
The what if is pulling a lot of weight here but I hope it makes my point.
Though there is also quantum key distribution, which will probably be solved as soon as quantum algorithms can break classical encryption.
That said, there are quantum-resistant key establishment algorithms out there, and more likely one of them will be selected.
It becomes manageable to break it now with a QC.