That’s a scary vulnerability. There’s no mention of the bug bounty paid out for it but I hope it was substantial.
So from that I can imply there was no payment.
All I got was an email: that is interesting bye bye. But it was fixed in the next patch or the next after I think.
So I didn't care to report the two bigger problems I found with Azure Information Protection [1][2] I thought about reporting them but decided against it.
And I will continue to tell people that I don't care to do free work for MS when they won't even give me a t-shirt, a mug or even acknowledge it.
Maybe if one is a security researcher it can be worth it but if you just find something interesting you'll probably be better rewarded by reddit or HN, yes, the upvotes are worthless but less so than a dismissive email.
[1] one in the downloadable AIP tooling where you can easily smuggle clear text information with rock solid plausible deniability - I found it by accident after having implemented a part of a pipeline in the most obvious way I could think of.
[2]: the second had to do with how one can configure SharePoint to automatically protect files with AIP on download, the only problem being if you logged in using another login sequence (sorry for the lack of details, this was before the pandemic and it was just a small part of what I was working on at the time) SharePoint would conveniently forget all about it despite all efforts by me, the security admin at the company and the expert that Microsoft sent to fix it.
Ha ... ha ... ha ... ha ... did they give you the run around for several months until you dropped the issue? It's actually pretty astounding that they don't get sued for this practice. If a company is paying for support and are given illiterate noobs then that is breach of contract I would think. I would never recommend entering a contract with MSFT, they produce trash products they can't support and are more invested in their Legal team than actual product.
Think of the cost of opportunity in having smart, capable, experienced staff doing support or backports instead of actual dev work. (Especially backports, which when they were done frequently they were done precisely because customers are risk-averse, so a great deal more review and testing (with a much larger test matrix) was required for backports, with attendant huge increase in cost.) That cost is enormous. But of course they do need to provide some support, and at some point some really good support for the really serious bugs, and the vendor will in time do it, but first the customer demand and pressure has to build.
I feel like I know more about M365 than anyone I talk to at MS. That's bad.
Azure basic support is pretty bad. I am even surprised at how bad some of the higher tiers of support are. I have no frame of reference for other cloud providers but anecdotally they are not so great either (some CSP's I am told are worse).
All in all - wrt documentation - software docs have gone downhill across the industry since the 90's. And back then people were still loudly grumbling about how bad the docs were!
Managers on the support side or your teams?
I had a friend who worked for an Cable ISP decades ago in the UK. Management of support management got outsourced to another company, who set aggressive targets for call length. Not average call length, but call length of any call they received. Any call that went over the target was a mark against the support person, and if you got more than a few marks you got a dressing down by the supervisor, a few more after that would get you a written warning, and then a few more would see you fired.
It started out at 15 minutes, and that was okayish. It took about 6 minutes to reboot a cable modem and have it come on-line, and that was done with almost every single support case, and fixed at least half of them.
Then they cut it down to 10 minutes. That was squeezing it a bit. 4 minutes at the most to do all introductions, hear the problem, wait for modem reboot and test things were resolved.
Then they cut it down to 5 minutes. The support folks had literally no choice but to just randomly hang up on people as soon as they got close to 5 minutes, or ask them to do a reboot of the modem and phone back. "Oh, I'm sorry, we must have been randomly disconnected"
Honestly I’m surprised they even acknowledged that as a bug, given there are many ways to get a whole lot more info than what you demonstrated, for instance the builtin “eye” button that is purpose built to reveal the full password to anyone with physical access to the machine wishing to see it.
This wasn't such a case.
That said, I didn't expect it to get rich, it was just that the experience didn't give me anything back for the effort I put in.
:-)
"Microsoft confirms partial loss of security log data on multiple platforms" - https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/microsoft-loss-securi...
"Microsoft called out for ‘blatantly negligent’ cybersecurity practices" - https://www.theverge.com/2023/8/3/23819237/microsoft-azure-b...
I'm glad they fixed it, but this doesn't seem too scary??
If user U can gain access to keyvault K via this exploit, it is scary.
[Vendors/Contingent staff will often be granted read-level access to a subscription under the assumption that they won't have access to secrets, for example.]
(I'm open to the possibility that I'm misunderstanding the exploit)
The secret typically is a user account (OAuth token), but it could also be an App Id/Secret.
It seems to me the KeyVault secret leak originated when KeyVault K owners gave secret reader permissions to the API Connection. (And I will note that granting permissions in Azure requires Owner role-which way more privileged than the Reader role mentioned in this article.)
[edit - article used Reader role, not Contributor role]