Note that the link in the article is mangled. The link text is <https://no-sct.badssl.com/>, but the actual href points to <https://certificate.transparency.dev/useragents/>. Your comment has the correct link which gives the warning.
For context, in about:config my security.pki.certificate_transparency.mode is set to 2. According to https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Certificate_Tra... if it's on 0 (disabled) or 1 (not enforcing, collecting telemetry only), you can enable it.
I can imagine Mozilla setting that setting to 1 by default (collecting telemetry on sites you visit) and Debian overridding it for privacy purposes.
I was under the impression it just checked the certificate for an inclusion proof, and actual monitoring of consistency between these proofs and logs is done by non-browser entities.
This would detect e.g. US government forces Google's log to cover up a CIA-obtained certificate for north-korean-military.example so it works fine for visitors, but the Korean's can't see it in the public logs. There's no sign that anything like this has ever happened, but in theory it would be easier to pull off since gossip is not implemented.