> In 2015 and 2016, Apple Inc. received and objected to or challenged at least 11 orders issued by United States district courts under the All Writs Act of 1789. Most of these seek to compel Apple "to use its existing capabilities to extract data like contacts, photos and calls from locked iPhones running on operating systems iOS 7 and older" in order to assist in criminal investigations and prosecutions. A few requests, however, involve phones with more extensive security protections, which Apple has no current ability to break. These orders would compel Apple to write new software that would let the government bypass these devices' security and unlock the phones.
https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple%E2%80%93FBI_encryption_...
Basically it's not a hack someone just throws on the internet for everyone to use, it's WAY too valuable to burn like that.
This is true for pretty much every “real” hsm on the planet btw. No one is sharing cutting edge enclave details, Apple isn’t unique in this regard.
> Conceptually, Advanced Data Protection is simple: All CloudKit Service keys that were generated on device and later uploaded to the available-after-authentication iCloud Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) in Apple data centers are deleted from those HSMs and instead kept entirely within the account’s iCloud Keychain protection domain. They are handled like the existing end-to-end encrypted service keys, which means Apple can no longer read or access these keys.
[0]: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote...