Multiple Russian Threat Actors Targeting Microsoft Device Code Authentication
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(Denying, through non-discoverability, haphazard access controls, buggy application behavior, and often simply being deleted.)
And that's not my only major objection to the current Microsoft dysfunctional-company software suite. I just realized I'm clenching my teeth, from recalling how harmful that load of shit was, the last time I saw it crippling employee effectiveness.
The only discoverability I have seen work in Sharepoint, is the person who wrote something linking the document directly to a person in a pm.
Turns out it doesn't matter how many security trainings we make them go through.
Then no amount of practice would make any difference?
In the rest of professions, the reward is to keep their job and business, when compliance isn't ignored.
If I login from my computer and a few hours later an attacker logs in from the other side of the planet, most big providers will trigger extra checks/email notifications of unusual events.
I wonder if intentionally using Tor/VPS is a way to bypass those checks, since a Tor/VPS can have a far away geo-IP.
The Era of Login/Password Security was much more secure anyway, dunno why we regressed to this. Because printer needs your microsoft account now?
Now that Microsoft is no longer the wealthiest, most powerful company in tech, fewer people refer to it as 'M$'. Microsoft should thank Google and Facebook for making Microsoft look modest and saintly in comparison.
Disabling device authentication (which is rarely needed anyway) and forcing Microsoft Authenticator (with the yes-this-is-really-me number entry thing) or something like a Yubikey should make your org like 99% less vulnerable. If you're not on a Microsoft-or-similar platform (good for you!), one word of advice: passkeys.
As for the inevitable "who would fall for this" question: prior to 2017, when Google instituted a strict 2FA policy, even members of their elite security team were successfully phished. After that, not so much: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neu...
Currently it's very easy to make a fake MS login prompt, even to customize it with your company name and logo. If you fall for that, they have your PW, which probably at least works without 2FA on some random corpo websites like your time tracking or travel expenses or whatnot.
1. You shouldn't be reusing your password anywhere else anyway.
2. Microsoft corporate 2FA doesn't give you three choices, but wants you to enter the number from your keypad, unlike consumer 2FA, preventing flooding attacks and trusting that you'll tap the right one accidentally.
2. Yes, I know how the MS 2FA flow works. But why doesn't it have you enter number on device first, type password second? Seems like it would give users a better way of knowing the login request is legit?
If I send the password they need to hash then compare. Only then do they need to generate some form of random number - write to some store - send a notification to the users device - query the store from the users device - likely again hash an compare - send a notification to the endpoint signing in. To do that for millions / billions of users seems like it would be expensive compared to a hash + DB lookup.
How? First off if it's a TOTP without a notification the fake website can just ignore the TOTP input and always say it's correct and move to collecting your password. If it's a notification type 2FA, when you go to the fake site it can request a login with your username in the background which will send you a notification, you will enter the 2FA code and then password which the attacker will login with.
You're right, hadn't thought of this. But I wish there was a better way to verify that the login prompt is genuine, today it seems almost arbitrarily hard to be 100% sure of this.
This is essentially what happens with a YubiKey so it's phishing resistant. It also happens with a passkey but thats just one factor since a unlocked stolen PC can login. For a smartphone as second you can probably have a similar setup by requiring a bluetooth or USB connection between the laptop/pc and the smartphone, but it comes with its own disadvantages. Can also work with QR codes I guess, but with the browser generating it from URL, not the site.
> Only allow device code flow where necessary. Microsoft recommends blocking device code flow wherever possible. Where necessary, configure Microsoft Entra ID’s device code flow in your Conditional Access policies.
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/13/sto...
What kind of bright mind would consider not moving unsolicited emails like these straight to a dust bin?
You get a lot of stuff in the inbox that doesn't exactly relate to your day to day work from departments you only vaguely heard about.
Then the UX of corporate stuff, especially one from microsoft is designed in a way to randomly jump in your face with a password prompt without you starting it actively. The session timeout here, kerberos prompt for smartcard here, the vpn hickup, teams needs to reconnect after the laptop gets out of sleep state. Then half of it random at some point updates and looks subtly different too.
After some exposure to this kind of stuff you don't even know what's real and what's level of corporate-sanctioned bullshit is above or below the baseline set by The Policy.
Most of the time I have an inbox rule enabled that just deletes anything not from the corporate domain and a few other known services.
What you are suggesting here sounds insane. You only get work emails from your corporate domain and a few others?
Then they ran a phishing test and it didn't have the external banner :D
Maybe if they get the reputation they deserve they’ll change their ways
After all, it's not that they're routinely required to enter their password on an endless list of websites all the time to do their job right? Right?
OMG. Did not consider that. Lucky me. I do software development for clients, include some of decent size but am independent to the point that all my development is done at my own premises (basement of my house;) .
[0] Virginia commonly uses Fortinet's lesson plans, for example.