Comments on that youtube video are filled with industry insiders and it’s just wild. They even think someone has died from a similar fuming event back in December…
The part about filling the cabin with smoke because they couldn’t be bothered to make the software that detects the extreme vibration tell the AC units from that engine to shut down (which they already do if the rpm drops, indicating an engine failure-just not soon enough or reliable enough to prevent the smoke issue) - not so much.
The system for the ECU to detect the engine mount failure condition already exists. The function to shut down the air handlers in response to a different indicator of engine failure already exists in the ECU. It’s just literally “also shut down if the engine mounts fail”, but the guys that sit around and think about the what ifs were given early retirement to make room for more MBAs.
Sure, I get that it was added to prevent plane from disintegrating, but like you said integration thinking is gone and now we have those individual components that sure look homicidal from outside.
The other issue is that regulators are missing in action or worse. It’s no way to run the industry by relying on concerned youtubers..
Frikken clown world hijinks.
So no this wasn’t the victim of a rescope.
How difficult is that?
Actually, I think this was less about cost and more about systemic creep of operational differentiation from earlier versions of the 737. A big selling point for the MBAs was that this was a 737 and pilot recertification was not necessary. So the MCAS system and its deadly potential was hidden from the pilot manual, as was the new failure mode introduced by this system. Acknowledgement that these systems required additional or different contingencies or checklists, or intruding an automatic shutdown of a pressurization would require recertification in type, or potentially even recertification of the aircraft if the changes were significant enough.
Significantly, for MCAS, the reason that the stability of the aircraft had to be patched in software, leading to hundreds of deaths, was that changing the empennage to reestablish aerodynamic stability might have been a big enough change to require recertification of the airframe. That would have been expensive, but it would have also opened the door to fixing all of these other issues that resulted from trying to pretend that the aircraft was not significantly different from earlier versions.
Its bean counters all the way down, and dead passengers is the price of that.
From the video, the 39 second figure is for the cockpit if the pilots don't get their masks on in time. The passenger cabin would be uncomfortable but wouldn't (or just didn't in that case) reach lethal levels given the volume.
> They even think someone has died from a similar fuming event back in December…
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_International_Air_Lines_...
I wonder if they just need formaldehyde sensors in the bleed air line...
As far as I understand, the people in the cabin or the cockpit will breath the oil that's now been aerosolized -- in the cockpit it's really hazardous because it's such a small air volume. The oil's full of all kinds of things you wouldn't ever want to breathe in, and in the cockpit it's enough to poison you really fast.
The people can keep filtering a certain volume of oiled air, but at some point it's too much oil in their body.
If the people in the cockpit are incapacitated, though, it's a problem for everyone on the plane. The oil has nasty stuff that kills the pilots, but it's also hard to see through.
Basically, at the very very least, let's not dump the oil into the cockpit. Ideally let's not dump the oil into the passenger compartment either, but sheesh, let's not kill or blind the pilots as table stakes..