All good questions and I would be lying if I said I knew. My assumption is that Syria does not work without the revenue, as evidenced by the fall of Assad and many other poor petrostates when the tap is cut off. Most states cant survive a 40% budget shortfall, let alone a fledgling one trying to bind together many armed factions.
HTS & Ahmed al-Sharaa is reportedly not open to national partition [1], but the SDF is unwilling to integrate into the national military structure.
It might work as an uncomfortable trupple if the US and HTS are willing to be bedfellows, but it is unclear if that is attractive or even viable for either. Everything we know about Ahmed al-Sharaa indicates they they should be a ideological enemy, and the only thing that hedges against this is that it would be really convenient if they wern't. Maybe this will be shown in time, but military trust building is measured in terms of years or decades, while payroll is due weekly.
In general, I think Syrian Kurdistan is a fascinating example cognitive blindness, where the US public and media simply memory holes anything that happens there because creates too much cognitive dissonance. This was true when the US was fighting Russia for the oilfields, and is happening again now, as NATO allied Turkey is bombing Kobani cement factories to impede US base building. [2]
https://www.twz.com/news-features/u-s-reportedly-setting-up-...
https://hawarnews.com/en/renewed-bombing-by-turkish-occupati...