It most certainly does; the statutory definition is that there can be no information service without an underlying telecommunication service. So how could any court rule that ISPs who own the wires coming into my house are providing purely an information service and no part of their business can be regulated as a telecommunication service?
My service agreement with my ISP explicitly says it is a circuit.
And also the argument isn't if it's an Internet service or a telecommunications service, it's if it's an information service or telecommunications service. Quit throwing your own common parlance terminology here and use the language in the law and the courts please!
Does it? We have definitions for "information service" that clearly fit running a server, and "telecommunication service" defined in a way that clearly fits carrying data over wires, unmodified, and some potential gray area in between that might include looking up information to figure out how to correctly route other information.
You've repeatedly emphasized the "offering a capability" angle, and so does the court. On the subject of capabilities offered by ISPs, the court says:
> they offer a “feature[] permitting” consumers to stream videos stored on Netflix’s servers, [...] the “ability” to purchase gifts from information stored on Amazon’s servers, [...] the “capacity” to view posts stored on Facebook’s servers, [...] and the “power” to conduct a search using Google’s servers
But the court pretends that this piece of capability (feature/ability/capacity/power) being offered by ISPs (as opposed to Netflix, Amazon, et. al. who actually run the servers) is not exactly the telecommunications service the FCC seeks to regulate as a telecommunications service. The court appears to believe that merely being able to use the word "capability" to describe ISPs (while implicitly lumping together functions performed by ISPs with those performed by Netflix, et. al.) is sufficient to make ISPs not telecommunications services.
This is a whole thread of people over and over and over again saying that the courts should read the 1996 Telecommunications Act in light of what telecommunications looks like in 2025 (or what they, 2025 practitioners, believe a 1996 practitioner should have thought --- as a former 1996 practitioner my response to that is: LOL). That's exactly what the post-Chevron courts are not going to do.
So far as I know, this distinction made it to SCOTUS just once (and: in the 21st century!), and when it did, the court said: the Internet is like Prodigy, CompuServe, and AOL.
But broadband ISPs today occupy the place of the Bell system, plus some of the lower layers of AOL, and broadband ISPs do not occupy the place of the higher layers of AOL (the search engines, content publishing, etc.).
AOL without any means for your modem to reach AOL's modem is roughly similar to the World Wide Web without any ISP to carry your packets to and from somebody else's servers. (And I've long believed we need stronger regulations to make it clear that ISPs are responsible for providing more than just WWW access.)
Do you somehow think that the overturning of Chevron means that courts do not need to figure out where the role of Google Fiber today fits into the categories defined in 1996?
And yet, the court seems to have rendered a decision. They don't seem to have declared that the question is not theirs to answer.