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I thought it was to DRM media?

As the article points out, the TPM is not in a good place, architecturally, to use for DRM: there's no path from the TPM to the screen that's not under OS (and thereby user) control.

The whole point of TPM is that the OS is not under the user control anymore.

If you modify it thanks to remote attestation you can no longer prove that it is unmodified using the TPM.

Do they mean that no OS modification is necessary to read the decrypted media from memory?

Currently, no. But once (undetectable) OS modification is no longer possible, making the undecrypted media unreadable is just a few API restrictions away.

In Android phones for example you cannot screenshot banking apps. And if you root (modify the OS of) your phone, banking apps refuse to work.

However, for the question at hand, that's irrelevant: a better (for DRM) solution exists today, and they're already using it.

I'm not saying that the TPM is incapable of being abused by manufacturers and OS authors, but the FSF really weakens their argument when they predicate it on something that's not actually true. Ex falso quodlibet (you may prove anything if you rely on a falsehood).

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