* https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware...
Interestingly enough, Signal (and others) had the same sort of vulnerability on Android from a WebRTC stack:
* https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-an...
The big issue in both cases is that the exploit was triggered before the user answered the call.
I think the moral here is that a secure messenger should not execute inherently insecure code (i.e.complex code) on behalf of entities that are not really well trusted by the user. The default should be always plain text.
There is the option of not having data and code sharing the same stack, that seems like a better solution to me but that's such an option is not usually talked about.
Well, RCE (cargo) is built into it. /s
Has your "memory safe" language been audited for security ?
Whattsup and co, are very happy to execute untrusted code: images displayed in messages, websites fetched and rendered. Basically a bad actor's wet dream.
> A U.S. judge ruled on Friday in favor of Meta Platforms' (META.O), opens new tab WhatsApp in a lawsuit accusing Israel's NSO Group of exploiting a bug in the messaging app to install spy software allowing unauthorized surveillance.
Encryption is important but it often is not the weakest link in the security chain.
Bitwarden is already a big step up from what most people are doing, then if you want to hide from gouvernement you better make sure you save your password on extremely secured device. But that's another treat level from the average Joe.
I’m more worried about financial scams than I am anything related to government. Password managers with random passwords are an excellent guard against that threat.
If I were worried about state actor threats, any keys or passwords would be memorized.
The point is that a password manager is an additional weak link in the chain.