When we say one species is more intelligent than another, one breed of dog, or one person -- we aren't describing a difference in their organisational structure. And when we want to build intelligent systems we aim to build things that have specific capacities, not that have this sort of abstract organisation which is entirely orthogonal to these capacities.
One dog is more intelligent than another if it can read the intentions of its owner (theory of mind), coordinate in its environment (eg., open doors, etc.), plan more extended actions, pretend/fake actions to confuse the owner/other-dogs, and so on.
These ranges of capacities do not follow from an abstract 'organisational' description of the dog. The great pseudoscience of this 'computer science' thinking is that abstracts to a degree of description that is almost universal, then claims to make fine-grained distinctions.
That the earth-and-moon are 2, and the tree-and-bird are 2, does not mean the earth-and-sun and the tree-and-bird are sharing in any capacities at all. To instantiate an abstract description implies almost nothing.