It's possible that the secure rng incorporates observed entropy; there might not be enough entropy available when you need it, if secure is made the default and therefore used unnecessarily.
They're acknowledging that cryptographically useful entropy is a limited resource for the system as a whole, and naive exhaustion can either causes starvation, unbounded blocking, or degradation depending on the implementation.
Having a casual array shuffle seize up because there's not enough secure entropy available might just be an absurd nuisance in many cases. But having an session key or uuid generator seize up because somebody burnt all the entropy on casual array shuffles can be a real problem for users. (And much worse so if the implementation just silently degrades in quality instead of blocking or failing, as some have done.)
Every mainstream OS is trivially capable of seeding the system secure RNG by the time userspace applications need to consume it. There is no availability / depletion problem for userspace.
When the supply is treated conscientiously, depletion broadly doesn't matter outside of weird race conditions during system startup. But if everybody naively consumes cryptographically secure randomness for every casual occasion, it becomes a much bigger problem.
The parent comment is correct: entropy depletion is a weird meme. Unfortunately, Linux encoded that meme into its legacy KRNG ("/dev/random"), so lots of people believe it to be real. It is not, and modern userland programs don't use "/dev/random" anyways.
It's not the only such system, nor has that "legacy KPRN" been eradicated from real-world use.
Moreso, I can't understand how someone who seemingly has as much seasoning and experience as yourself can fathom making generalizing claims like "modern userland programs don't X".
Application software and the platforms that it runs are insanely more diverse than that, especially now that we live in a world where people just paste in verbatim docker stacks that they read about in some blogspam tutorial written 12 years ago, and countless others are building on frameworks and dependencies that are themselves broken in ways they oughtn't be (like Flutter, in the article).
While there exist contexts where cryptographically secure randomness may be treated as inexhaustible, we're decades away from being able to take that for granted across "modern userland programs" and its much safer to have people anticipate the dangers of exhaustion than it is to have them presume its universally inexhaustible.
"LRNG" => (idiosyncratic) shorthand for "Linux's KRNG".
The LRNG never had the problem you're alluding to. It's not as if the literature eventually found "inexhaustible" designs. They were never exhaustible. There is no such danger. You can get to this axiomatically by looking at how a CSPRNG works (again: it's effectively a stream cipher construction), or empirically by reading about it. Either way: no, you're wrong here.
As recently as node 16 or 18 or so, which is still in real-world use despite its age, reaning on the real-word docker images that these projects use, it happens. And when it does, you can rightly guess that all the client's javascript developers were utterly perplexed specifically because they'd never heard of such a concern. But you point to the stack trace for when their call to uuid never resolves and provide all the documentation from familiar bloggers to help them wrap their heads around it, and voila -- the mysterious and catastrophic issue that's been plaguing them is suddenly remedied.
As I said, I appreciate that exhaustion doesn't need to happen in anything with an appropriate design. That's genuinely great. But even if it's just a certain and inappropriate way of using the linux RNG in a certain window of Linux versions (and I'm not strictly convinced its even so narrow a scenario), that's a actually a pretty common real thing that real developers will continue to encounter in the wild for longer than any us might want, and not some baseless myth or meme.
Honestly it's kind of refreshing to see a thread like this. This was a live issue on HN like 10 years ago, when cryptographers started yelling at Ted T'so about how dumb "/dev/random" was, and generalist engineers on HN argued about it. But it has since become a settled matter --- here, I mean. Among cryptography engineers: never a doubt.
There are KRNG security issues! You can come up with cases, especially with embedded software or older hypervisors, where code runs with an unseeded RNG. That's very bad. But those issues aren't relevant to ordinary userland code; if your system can't run with the assumption that "/dev/urandom" is seeded, you're fucked for other reasons, so distributions (and hypervisors) go out of their way to ensure that can't happen.
At any rate: there is no case where "exhaustion" comes into play, and there never has been, but there was an archaic kernel interface in Linux that thought there could be such a thing, so there's a whole generation of Linux developers who believe it's a big deal. It is not.
A language designer or library developer, especially, generally can't assert that their code will only run on the most robust, modern, popular systems currently available. They need to work defensively, anticipating the issues that they may plausibly encounter -- especially where those issues will not be apparent to less expert application developers.
And those less expert application developers are in an even worse position, because many barely even know what they're doing in the first place, making all kinds of foolish decisions while they paste together their docker script and relying on inexpert devops/sre people (or end users!) who make their own choices about what things are running on.
It's encouraging to learn that there are now established, widespread, inexhaustibly secure RNG's out there. But it remains irrelevant to a discussion of what developers need to keep themselves mindful of because there remain many implementations in the wild that don't behave like that and most developers aren't in a position to guarantee which their code will encounter.
(Yes, I know, you have shared a workaround for a long time prior: https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-rando... . But that sort of presumes a clued-in user.)