China's Salt Typhoon recorded top American officials' calls, says White House

> Letting the adversary know that you know can be a useful move.

Taking into account the latest wave of hardcoded passwords in Cisco, Fortinet and Palo Alto, i don't think that was the intention.

I personally don't see how these actions are logically correlated, and moreover, I don't think it does anything to harden US critical infrastructure to beat the Huawei dead horse again.

The primary concern should be the fact that we've built infrastructure that is easily eavesdropped on by foreign adversaries. Heck, assuming these users weren't on DSN, we already have a solution: DSN. We also have mobile solutions, like asking politically vulnerable people to use Signal, or developing secure technology for these users to use.

A bit one-sided since this event also shows how filled with backdoors American telecom equipment is, no? To the point an adversary used them, other nations should be afraid of their American equipment also getting compromised.

Ignoring the geopolitical implications of your comment.

They used unpatched exploits in EOL network gear made by linksys that were several years past their expiration date to get into this system and then moved laterally. The root cause is a lack of investment in backbone security.

I would like the actual problem be fixed instead of a scapegoat this time.