So apparently not.
You can, however, get the same human experience by contracting a consulting company that will bill you $20 000 per month and lie to you about having absolute knowledge.
Unless I’m misunderstanding, I disagree. If you reply, I’ll bet I can convince you.
LLMs are stochastic parrots incapable of thought or reasoning. Even their chains of thoughts are part of the training data.
Based on my study (not at the Ph.D. level but still quite intensive), I am confident the comment above is both wrong and poorly framed. Why? Seeing phrases "incapable of thought" and "stochastic parrots" are red flags to me. In my experience, people that study LLM systems are wary of using such brash phrases. They tend to move the conservation away from understanding towards combativeness and/or confusion.
Being this direct might sound brusque and/or unpersuasive. My top concern at this point, not knowing you, is that you might not prioritize learning and careful discussion. If you want to continue discussing, here is what I suggest:
First, are you familiar with the double-crux technique? If not, the CFAR page is a good start.
Second, please share three papers (or high-quality writing from experts): one that supports your claim, one that opposes it, and one that attempts to synthesize.
Third, perhaps we can find a better forum.
Stochastic Generative models can generate new and correct data if the distribution is right. Its in the definition
Some other intelligent social animals have slightly different brains, and it seems very likely they "think" as well. Do we want to define "thinking" in some relative manner?
Say you pick a definition requiring an isomorphism to thoughts as generated by a human brain. Then, by definition, you can't have thoughts unless you prove the isomorphism. How are you going to do that? Inspection? In theory, some suitable emulation of a brain is needed. You might get close with whole-brain emulation. But how do you know when your emulation is good enough? What level of detail is sufficient?
What kinds of definitions of "thought" remains?
Perhaps something related to consciousness? Where is this kind of definition going to get us? Talking about consciousness is hard.
Anil Seth (and others) talks about consciousness better than most, for what it is worth -- he does it by getting more detailed and specific. See also: integrated information theory.
By writing at some length, I hope to show that using loose sketches of concepts using words such as "thoughts" or "thinking" doesn't advance a substantive conversation. More depth is needed.
Meta: To advance the conversation, it takes time to elaborate and engage. It isn't easy. An easier way out is pressing the down triangle, but that is too often meager and fleeting protection for a brittle ego and/or a fixated level of understanding.
After coming back to this to see how the conversation has evolved (it hasn't), I offer this guess: the problem isn't at the object level (i.e. what ML research has to say on this) nor my willingness to engage. A key factor seems to a lack of interest on the other end of the conversation.
> Their position is falsifiable through simple examples: LLMs can perform arithmetic on numbers that weren't in training data, compose responses about current events post-training, and generate novel combinations of ideas.
Spot on. It would take a lot of editing for me to speak as concisely and accurately!
You can also expand it by adding in more concepts to better specify things. For example you can specify the mecha look like alphabet characters while the alien planet expresses the randomness of prime numbers and that might influence the AI to produce a more unique image as you are now getting into really weird combinations of concepts (and combinations that might actually make no sense if you think too much about them), but you also greatly increase the chance of getting trash output as the AI can no longer map the feature space back to an image that mirrors anything like what a human would interpret as having a similar feature space.
[1]: Bender, Emily M., et al. "On the dangers of stochastic parrots: Can language models be too big?." Proceedings of the 2021 ACM conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency. 2021.