What to Do About Conspiracy Theories?

Oddly enough I am a retired Psychotherapist, I'm not crazy either.

Maybe I am a conspiracy therapist. Now theres a thing

There is always a nugget of truth in conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories lay on the edge of paranoia.

Humans need some paranoia it keeps us safe, it is healthy to experience paranoia.

A poor example;

Take the paranoid psychiatric patient who is convinced that their psychiatric team is trying to kill them by over prescribing their medication.

The facts are there. The psychiatrist has been increasing the dose of anti-psychotics. The patient has been feeling very unwell and frazzled. The patient is experiencing pressure from the clinical team that insists the medication must be take in line with the psychiatrists recommendations. The patient insists that they felt OK before the increase in medication.

There is clearly a nugget of truth in what the patient is saying even though the clinical team and psychiatrist are convinced that the patient is Paranoid.

Does the patient actually have paranoid delusions or are the psychiatric team just following protocols and not listening to the patient, by doing so creating an environment where paranoia can run out of control.

50 "intelligence" professionals lied about the Hunter Biden laptop. Mentioning that story was suppressed and classified as a "conspiracy theory".

Now they admit that the laptop is genuine, and the person who may or may not be "the big guy" has pardoned Hunter Biden retroactively up to 2014, when he was at Burisma.

(Similar stories can be told about Republicans, this is just the most recent one and the difference is that mainstream is currently lying for the Democrats.)

On the other hand, right from the abstract, this book commits this exact fallacy.

> Increasingly social activists, journalists and policy makers have expressed concern over the proliferation of conspiracy theories in the public space. There is a growing fear of their impact on social cohesion and democracy, their power to erode trust in state institutions and science. These concerns often come with an expectation that it is the responsibility of academics to engage with conspiracy beliefs by countering them. But should they?

Obviously the answer is "it depends".

* In situations where the purported conspiracy is so absurd as to be difficult to evaluate for its evidence basis (eg, flat earth coverup by NASA), it is probably best addressed as a problem of literacy / numeracy and critical thinking skills. It's not at all obvious that this type of theory is on the rise - in fact, it may be at an all time low. Consider, for example, that less than 400 years ago, legally sanctioned trials were held for almost 200 people in Massachusetts on charges of literal witchcraft. 19 were executed. Such a thing is very unlikely to happen anywhere on earth today, let alone a highly literate society.

* In situations where clear criminal conduct is alleged, with cogent accusations and at least plausible sources of evidence are suggested, it makes sense to investigate and engage in a multi-disciplinary approach. For example, the recent accusations of unblinding and coverups at Pfizer warrant examination through lenses of medical science, humanities, public policy, and several others.

* In situations where actual conspiracies have unambiguously occurred, which this book seems loath to acknowledge at all, instead of "countering them", it is helpful to hold the conspirators to the same standards of law as petty criminals are held. In the case of involvement of state agents, it is also helpful to change the structure of government to prevent similar outcomes in the future.

The third chapter, "Evaluating conspiracy claims as public sphere communication", begins with a completely dismissive and frankly charlatan approach:

> From a communication studies perspective, conspiracy theories undermine democratic communication by misleading the public. However, the normative concept of a democratic public sphere also upholds the values of giving visibility to diverse perspectives and facilitating reasoned debate.

To suggest that the only reason to have public discourse over conspiracies is "the normative concept of a democratic public sphere" is so self-important and anti-academic... it's hard to imagine how this chapter found inclusion in any serious publication, let alone one which purports to advance the conversation on this exact topic.

Skimming through the other chapters, they all appear to exhibit similar problems. Frankly, this seems like a page one rewrite.