When a Telescope Is a National-Security Risk
theatlantic.com
theatlantic.com
The secret part about spy satellites is not their location but rather their payload. I suspect the reason the government wants to censor images is that a high-resolution picture could allow an adversary to infer a lot about payloads including imaging resolution, communications frequencies, power budget, and possibly even defensive systems.
How does that match up with [0]?
"... a satellite that stalks other satellites, started another relocation move on July 22, leaving its position near ASTRA 4A at longitude 4.8 E and drifting west at 0.9 degrees per day."
Do they make this up, or do you and I have a vastly different understanding of "irregular"?
[0] https://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2024/07/the-russian-sigint-...
It basically says the telescope can take high res pictures of secret satellites, but they have to wait 3 days to release them.
It claims after 3 days, nobody will know where they are “now.”
That seems to suggest the concern is location, not appearance. It also suggests the locations aren’t predictable.
https://sattrackcam.blogspot.com/2024/05/the-nrol-146-payloa...
That's historic data
We’re going to be learning what a joke the past century of government transparency has been, and it’s not going to be a pleasant feeling.
Just pointing to the Graves Radar in France whose frequency and beam pattern is precisely known to the public.