What does the discovery of the Bootkitty UEFI bootkit for Linux systems suggest about the evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats?
In fact, this bootkit would be about the least thing I would worry about. Because by the time an attack can write to /boot, they can also write to /etc/init.d . And the later is not protected by "secure boot".
Bootkits are to make the infection both more difficult to detect and remove, so whether /etc/init.d is writable is pretty irrelevant.
The entire boot system has much, much fewer places for malware to hide compared to the entire "rootkit" OS attack surface which is astronomically larger. Secure Boot has always targeted the smaller and most useless of the swiss cheese holes.
Trustworthy people don't ask you to trust them.
But those are merely defaults which you do posess ultimate control over, unlike the blobs and secrets in various bits of hardware.
You can say that I implicitly trust the browser vendor's judgement in what CAs to trust, by the virtue of using the browser, and I'd agree with that. But saying that I was asked by the browser publisher to trust them? No, I disagree, I wasn't. It was a silent decision.